Abstract:In this paper, we investigate a new model of a linear-quadratic mean-field stochastic Stackelberg differential game with one leader and two followers, in which the leader is allowed to stop her strategy at a random time. Our overarching goal is to find the Stackelberg solution of the leader and followers for such a model. By employing the backward induction method, the state equation is divided into two-stage equations. Moreover, by using the maximum principle and the verification theorem, the Stackelberg solu… Show more
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