A influência das redes de relações corporativas no desempenho das empresas do Novo Mercado da BOVESPA

Abstract

The role played by the board of a firm is one of the main aspects considered in literature on corporate governance around of the world. simultaneously, the social and institutional relations have been seen as preponderant factor for the happened results of the performance of such boards of big companies. However not yet research is verified that analyze the role of the boards from the Social Network Analysis (SNA) in Brazil. In this manner, this study aims to verify the existence of associations between centrality level, density and cohesion of the boards of Brazilian companies and firmperformance. Then, we evaluate 615 individuals, that had formed the boards of the 90 listed companies in the Novo Mercado of the S˜ao Paulo Stock Exchange in 2007. The analysis was lead in two phases. In the first one we present the configuration of the networks of board members, in second place, we verify associations between structure of the network and performance. It was verified that the centrality, density and the cohesion of the firms, in terms of its board members, are related with performance, some times in terms of Return Over Assets (Roa), some times in debt. Of this form, we conclude that organizations most located in the networks of corporative relations tend to present greater yield and minor debt.

Redes Interorganizacionais e Criação de Valor Corporativo no Brasil

“…Neste estudo, os indicadores de formação de redes estão alinhados aos de Ribeiro e Colauto (2016): grau de centralidade, adicionando-se a este a força de centralidade; grau de intermediação; tamanho do conselho, adicionando-se a este o tamanho da diretoria; e independência do conselho. Outros estudos utilizaram proxies similares para análise de redes por meio de board interlocking (Cunha & Piccoli, 2017;Mendes-da-Silva, Rossoni, Martin & Martelanc, 2008).…”

La influencia del board interlocking o cruce de consejeros en la selección de la empresa de auditoría en el período de cambio obligatorio

“…Control variables were determined to better interpret the influence of independent and dependent variables. There are control variables linked to the size of the company, such as size (Davison, Stening & Way, 1984;Phan, Lee & Lau, 2003;Mendes-da-Silva, Rossoni, Martin & Martelanc, 2008;Johansen & Pettersson, 2013). This variable is represented by the log of the total assets of each company.…”

“…Five variables related to the board of directors were included, one of them the size of the CA, since larger boards tend to perform more BI (Davison, Stening & Way, 1984;Mendes-da-Silva et al, 2008;Johansen & Pettersson, 2013). A larger number of advisors should be favorable to the company's performance and efficiency, as it entails a greater variety of knowledge and experience (Hsu & Petchakulwong, 2010).…”

“…The largest council verified in the companies was of 15 members. It should be noted that the larger boards tend to have the more interlocking board (Davison & Stening Way, 1984;Mendes-da-Silva et al, 2008;. & Johansen Pettersson, 2013).…”

“…In the case of council size, in Brazil, we have an average of 6 members, and in the study by Johansen and Pettersson (2013) in Denmark, for example, the average was 12.5. Thus, as the advice of these countries is larger, tend to have more board interlocking, and consequently, a greater possibility of spreading practices and experiences among members, as indicated by Davison, Stening and Way (1984), Mendes-da-Silva et al, (2008) and Johansen and Pettersson (2013).…”