A Graphical Approach to Risk Identification, Motivated by Empirical Investigations

Abstract

Abstract. We propose a graphical approach to identify, explain and document security threats and risk scenarios. Security risk analysis can be time consuming and expensive, hence, it is of great importance that involved parties quickly understand the risk picture. Risk analysis methods often make use of brainstorming sessions to identify risks, threats and vulnerabilities. These sessions involve system users, developers and decision makers. They typically often have completely different backgrounds and view the system from different perspectives. To facilitate communication and understanding among them, we have developed a graphical approach to document and explain the overall security risk picture. The development of the language and the guidelines for its use have been based on a combination of empirical investigations and experiences gathered from utilizing the approach in large scale industrial field trials. The investigations involved both professionals and students, and each field trial was in the order of 250 person hours.

Security risk analysis of system changes exemplified within the oil and gas domain

“…It also differs from other approaches in that it has been developed to facilitate communication and interaction during structured brainstorming sessions involving people of heterogeneous backgrounds [7,8,21]. To this end the CORAS language makes use of graphical symbols, or icons, that are closely related to the underlying risk analysis concepts, and that are intended to be easily comprehensible.…”

Using Dependent CORAS Diagrams to Analyse Mutual Dependency

“…The CORAS language has later been customised and rened in several aspects, based on experiences from industrial case studies, and by empirical investigations documented in [5,6,7]. Misuse cases [3,21,22] was an important source of inspiration in the development of the UML prole mentioned above.…”

Run-Time Risk Management in Adaptive ICT Systems

“…15 An asset's capacity is reduced (under-provisioning). 16 An asset is subjected to more use than expected (overuse). 17 An asset commits to do more than it can.…”

“…For example, Secure Tropos [14] provides a diagrammatic approach to risk modeling, which has been extended [15] to provide a domain model covering assets, risks and risk treatment related concepts, and asset security criteria for confidentiality, integrity and availability. The CORAS project [16], [17] also used a graphical approach to identify, explain and document security threats and risk scenarios. A graphical notation was developed to perform five security analysis tasks: Context establishment, Risk identification, Risk estimation, Risk evaluation and Treatment identification.…”