A dubious defense of ‘after‐birth abortion’: A reply to Räsänen

Kaczor, Christopher

doi:10.1111/bioe.12413

Cited by 6 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…Numerous philosophers have argued that Räsänen is unsuccessful in establishing a right to the death of the fetus whether AWT is viable or not. [6][7][8][9] Importantly, Thomson herself argues that there is no right to the death of the fetus. Mary Anne Warren makes a similar point: if a pregnancy could be ended without killing the fetus then there is no right to the fetus' death.…”

Section: Gestaticide Is Harder To Justify Than Abortionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…[19] Let 'fetal-function' refer to relevant physical and physiological characteristics typical of fetuses, while 'neonatal-function' refers to relevant characteristics typical of neonates. 8 Gestatelings have not transitioned from fetal-function to neonatal-function. Is this difference enough to show that gestaticide is easier to justify than infanticide?…”

Section: Gestaticide Is Infanticidementioning

confidence: 99%

“…For simplicity, we focus on subjects of partial ectogestation throughout this project (unless otherwise noted) 7. 'Other' neonates because we are supposing (for now) that gestatelings have been born 8. For a detailed explanation of the transition from fetal-function to neonatal-function, see Morton and Brodsky [41].…”

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confidence: 99%

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Gestaticide: killing the subject of the artificial womb

2020

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The rapid development of artificial womb technologies means that we must consider if and when it is permissible to kill the human subject of ectogestation—recently termed a ‘gestateling’ by Elizabeth Chloe Romanis—prior to ‘birth’. We describe the act of deliberately killing the gestateling as gestaticide and argue that there are good reasons to maintain that gestaticide is morally equivalent to infanticide, which we consider to be morally impermissible. First, we argue that gestaticide is harder to justify than abortion, primarily because the gestateling is completely independent of its biological parents. Second, we argue that gestaticide is morally equivalent to infanticide. To demonstrate this, we explain that gestatelings are born in a straightforward sense, which entails that killing them is as morally serious as infanticide. However, to strengthen our overall claim, we also show that if gestatelings are not considered to have been born, killing them is still equivalent to killing neonates with congenital anomalies and disabilities, which again is infanticide. We conclude by considering how our discussion of gestaticide has implications for the permissibility of withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from gestatelings.

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Section: Gestaticide Is Harder To Justify Than Abortionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Gestaticide Is Infanticidementioning

confidence: 99%

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Gestaticide: killing the subject of the artificial womb

2020

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“…According to my view, the moral wrongness of killing always outweighs time-relative interests, which means that invoking time-relative interests never can justify the killing of a human individual. This position is, however, fully compatible with the view that time-relative interests can be invoked to justify choices of saving human lives 3. Therefore, the affirmative conclusions about the permissibility—and even the obligation—of abortion are blocked on my view, which in turn means that it is not incompatible with the pro-life position.…”

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confidence: 69%

Defending the two tragedies argument: a response to Simkulet

Friberg‐Fernros

2019

J Med Ethics

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According to the two-tragedies argument proponents of pro-life can justifiably prioritize efforts to prevent abortion rather than miscarriages due to the fact that abortions in contrast to miscarriages involves usually the act of killing. William Simkulet has recently argued against this argument claiming that it fails as it (a) is in conflict with the common sense pro-life view on abortion and (b) leads to an overestimation of the moral value of preventing the ‘second tragedy’, namely the act of killing, compared with the value of preventing the death of an individual. In this article, I argue against to his charges against the two tragedies argument by demonstrating that this argument is not only compatible but also in line with the common sense pro-life view and that the argument does not overestimate moral significance of the act of killing.

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“…For a response to Simkulet (2017), see Friberg-Fernros (2018). For a response to Räsänen (2018), see Kaczor (2018). Lastly, while this paper was under review, Blackshaw and Rodger (2019) published a response to Ord's style of argument.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Miscarriage Is Not a Cause of Death: A Response to Berg’s “Abortion and Miscarriage”

Colgrove

2021

The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine

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Some opponents of abortion claim fetuses are persons from the moment of conception. Call these “Personhood-At-Conception” (or PAC), opponents of abortion. Amy Berg (2017, Philosophical Studies 174:1217–26) argues that if fetuses are persons from the moment of conception, then miscarriage kills far more people than abortion. Thus, PAC opponents of abortion must “immediately” and “substantially” shift their attention, resources, etc., toward preventing miscarriage or admit they do not believe that personhood begins at conception (or, at least, they should recognize they are not acting in ways consistent with this belief). Unfortunately, Berg’s argument fails at every step. After outlining her argument, I show that her claim—that “miscarriage . . . is much deadlier than abortion”—is false (when taken literally) and misleading otherwise. Further, Berg’s argument is identical in structure to a criticism sometimes levied against the “Black Lives Matter” movement. In the latter context, the argument has been vehemently rejected. Berg’s argument should be rejected for the same reasons. Finally, Berg cites no evidence when claiming that PAC opponents of abortion are “not doing enough” to prevent miscarriage. And, even if PAC opponents of abortion are not diverting substantial funds toward miscarriage prevention, Berg fails to notice that this may be for good reason.

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A dubious defense of ‘after‐birth abortion’: A reply to Räsänen

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

Gestaticide: killing the subject of the artificial womb

Gestaticide: killing the subject of the artificial womb

Defending the two tragedies argument: a response to Simkulet

Miscarriage Is Not a Cause of Death: A Response to Berg’s “Abortion and Miscarriage”

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