A Directive Antenna Based on Conducting Disks for Detecting Unintentional EM Emissions at Large Distances

Juyal, Prateek; Adibelli, Sinan; Sehatbakhsh, Nader; Zajić, Alenka

doi:10.1109/tap.2018.2870370

Cited by 14 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…In this paper, the measurement setups are deployed in a semi-anechoic chamber to emphasize the leakage response of the VDU. It has been confirmed in our previous and other works [7], [13], [21] that leaked emissions of electronic devices in realistic environments can be captured and compromise processed information. In our previous work [13], three different types of VDUs were placed in an uncontrolled environment with other electronic equipment present and were examined for their leakage response.…”

Section: B Measurement Setupssupporting

confidence: 72%

A Quantitative Approach to Eavesdrop Video Display Systems Exploiting Multiple Electromagnetic Leakage Channels

Meulemeester

Scheers

Vandenbosch

2020

IEEE Trans. Electromagn. Compat.

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This paper proposes a method that reconstructs the original video data signal from leaking electromagnetic emanations of multiple video signal sources using a software-defined radio (SDR). The results of the method give valuable insights into the potential risk of this threat of obtaining sensitive information in an everyday situation. The leaking emanations of co-located identical high definition liquid crystal displays are analyzed for possible data reconstruction using a SDR of a small form factor. It is proven that the leaked emanations of multiple identical active video display units (VDUs) can be separated from each other and that their separate video images can be reconstructed individually from one data acquisition. Moreover, this is done by recovering the synchronization frequencies and the image resolution by exploiting multiple leakage channels without having any foreknowledge of the VDU's properties. A multitude of leakage channels is investigated and analyzed for their radiation pattern and their signal-to-noise ratio, and is exploited to increase the quality of the reconstructed images employing multiple-input multiple-output based techniques. As far as we can see, our results and new insights in the nature and mechanisms of multiple compromising emanations are crucial for improving video data security.

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Section: B Measurement Setupssupporting

confidence: 72%

A Quantitative Approach to Eavesdrop Video Display Systems Exploiting Multiple Electromagnetic Leakage Channels

Meulemeester

Scheers

Vandenbosch

2020

IEEE Trans. Electromagn. Compat.

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“…As shown in Figure 1, the H-loop antenna of the SDR is placed right on top of the processor chip of the Raspberry Pi leaving a gap of approximately 1 cm in order to maximize the reception of EM emissions. While the experimental setup keeps the signal acquisition antenna closer to the target device, it is possible to use directional antennas and signal amplifiers to observe EM emissions from IoT devices at large distances up to several meters [31].…”

Section: Observing Em Emissionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Leveraging Electromagnetic Side-Channel Analysis for the Investigation of IoT Devices

Sayakkara

Le-Khac

Scanlon

2019

Digital Investigation

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Internet of Things (IoT) devices have expanded the horizon of digital forensic investigations by providing a rich set of new evidence sources. IoT devices includes health implants, sports wearables, smart burglary alarms, smart thermostats, smart electrical appliances, and many more. Digital evidence from these IoT devices is often extracted from third party sources, e.g., paired smartphone applications or the devices' back-end cloud services. However vital digital evidence can still reside solely on the IoT device itself. The specifics of the IoT device's hardware is a black-box in many cases due to the lack of proven, established techniques to inspect IoT devices. This paper presents a novel methodology to inspect the internal software activities of IoT devices through their electromagnetic radiation emissions during live device investigation. When a running IoT device is identified at a crime scene, forensically important software activities can be revealed through an electromagnetic side-channel analysis (EM-SCA) attack. By using two representative IoT hardware platforms, this work demonstrates that cryptographic algorithms running on high-end IoT devices can be detected with over 82% accuracy, while minor software code differences in low-end IoT devices could be detected over 90% accuracy using a neural network-based classifier. Furthermore, it was experimentally demonstrated that malicious modification of the stock firmware of an IoT device can be detected through machine learning-assisted EM-SCA techniques. These techniques provide a new investigative vector for digital forensic investigators to inspect IoT devices.

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“…For more information, see https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ attackers to control the intensity of the radiated EM waves. Therefore, radiated EM waves were captured with lightweight and miniaturized measurement setups [8], [17], [18], antennas with high gain, and instruments with wide resolution bandwidths [19], [20], depending on the attack scenario. Contrastingly, EM waves radiating from devices with a weak EM emission intensity may be below the background noise in the device's vicinity [21].…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Echo TEMPEST: EM Information Leakage Induced by IEMI for Electronic Devices

Kaji

Fujimoto

Kinugawa

et al. 2023

IEEE Trans. Electromagn. Compat.

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Electromagnetic (EM) information leakage encourages attacks, wherein the attackers passively capture and analyze EM waves that are unintentionally generated by devices. Generally, devices with weak EM emission intensities are not targeted. However, even these devices would be subject to attacks if it becomes possible to actively sense the electrical changes that occur within them when information is processed. This article demonstrates the feasibility of the information leakage threat induced by the active sensing of input impedance changes in the input/output (I/O) circuit of an integrated circuit (IC). Specifically, the changes in the input impedance when information was transmitted from the IC, were measured by irradiating the EM waves from outside the target device. This article labels the threat as Echo TEMPEST. The experiment validated Echo TEMPEST with an evaluation board that simulated the I/O circuit of the IC, UART modules, and USB keyboards. It was also demonstrated that attackers could control the distance (obtained information from the target device), depending on the intensity of the irradiated EM waves. Furthermore, we discussed countermeasure methods focusing on the conditions for executing Echo TEMPEST.

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A Directive Antenna Based on Conducting Disks for Detecting Unintentional EM Emissions at Large Distances

Cited by 14 publications

References 17 publications

A Quantitative Approach to Eavesdrop Video Display Systems Exploiting Multiple Electromagnetic Leakage Channels

A Quantitative Approach to Eavesdrop Video Display Systems Exploiting Multiple Electromagnetic Leakage Channels

Leveraging Electromagnetic Side-Channel Analysis for the Investigation of IoT Devices

Echo TEMPEST: EM Information Leakage Induced by IEMI for Electronic Devices

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