A Defence of Epistemic Consequentialism

Abstract

Epistemic consequentialists maintain that the epistemically right (e.g. the justified) is to be understood in terms of conduciveness to the epistemic good (e.g. true belief). Given the wide variety of epistemological approaches that assume some form of epistemic consequentialism, and the controversies surrounding consequentialism in ethics, it is surprising that epistemic consequentialism remains largely uncontested. However, in a recent paper, Selim Berker has provided arguments that allegedly lead to a 'rejection' of epistemic consequentialism. In the present paper it is shown that reliabilism-the most prominent form of epistemic consequentialism, and one of Berker's main targets-survives Berker's arguments unscathed.

Demoting promoting objections to epistemic consequentialism

“…So, it's not the promotion aspect of consequentialist views that gives rise to these objections; rather it's consequentialism's impartiality that does the work. As I mentioned above, I and others have defended versions of epistemic consequentialism from trade‐off objections (see Ahlstrom‐Vij & Dunn, ; Singer, , ). Since the goal of this paper is to defend consequentialism from promotion‐based objections, I won't recount my defense of consequentialism from trade‐off objections here, but I do encourage the reader to see that work, if they're interested.…”

“…I and others have defended versions of epistemic consequentialism from trade‐off objections (see Ahlstrom‐Vij & Dunn, ; Singer, , ). According to my view, epistemic consequentialists can avoid this kind of objection by construing their view as an account of right belief, which is distinct from notions like rational and justified belief.…”

Is There a Problem With Cognitive Outsourcing?

“…I will attempt to show that that suggestion is mistaken. Elsewhere, I have argued that epistemic instrumentalism invokes the correct axiology (Ahlstrom‐Vij a and b ), provides a defensible account of epistemic justification (Ahlstrom‐Vij and Dunn and forthcoming), and offers non‐trivial yet plausible social epistemological recommendations (Ahlstrom‐Vij c ). More to the present point, in working my way through each candidate problem for cognitive outsourcing in what follows, I hope to show that the instrumentalist's verdict in each instance is intuitively plausible, and moreover in accordance with established epistemic practices.…”

On Epistemic Consequentialism and the Virtue Conflation Problem

“…See Ahlstrom‐Vij and Dunn () for a recent defense of this general position; Compare Littlejohn (forthcoming) for criticism. For an overview of recent work, see Dunn ().…”