A counterexample to the Stalnaker-Lewis analysis of counterfactuals

Tichý, Pavel

doi:10.1007/bf00411887

Cited by 79 publications

(18 citation statements)

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“…Different cases come out differently, and I would like to know why. Tichý (1976) and Jackson (1977) give cases [like (C1)] which appear to come out right…only if approximate similarities count for nothing; but Morgenbesser has given a case [like (C2)], reported in Slote (1978), which appears to go the other way'' (Lewis 1986, p. 48). …”

Section: The Problemmentioning

confidence: 94%

Morgenbesser’s Coin, Counterfactuals, and Causal Versus Probabilistic Independence

Won

2009

Erkenn

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It is widely held that, as Morgenbesser's case is usually taken to show, considerations of causal or probabilistic dependence should enter into the evaluation of counterfactuals. This paper challenges that idea. I present a modified version of Morgenbesser's case and show how probabilistic approaches to counterfactuals are in serious trouble. Specifically, I show how probabilistic approaches run into a dilemma in characterizing probabilistic independence. The modified case also illustrates a difficulty in defining causal independence. I close with a suggestion for a strategy to handle this difficulty.The standard semantics for counterfactuals (Lewis 1973(Lewis , 1979 cannot deal with the case of Morgenbesser's coin. This case has generally been taken to highlight a need to appeal to the notion of causal or probabilistic independence in semantics for counterfactuals. This widespread diagnosis is mistaken or needs to be qualified, I think, in ways worth looking into. This paper begins by articulating exactly what problems Morgenbesser's case poses for Lewis's account and how causal and probabilistic approaches are supposed to solve the problems. I then present a modified case of Morgenbesser's coin and show how probabilistic approaches to counterfactuals face serious problems in dealing with it. Specifically, I show how probabilistic approaches run into a dilemma in characterizing probabilistic independence. The modified case also illustrates a difficulty in defining causal independence. I close by briefly sketching a possible strategy to handle that difficulty.

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Section: The Problemmentioning

confidence: 94%

Morgenbesser’s Coin, Counterfactuals, and Causal Versus Probabilistic Independence

Won

2009

Erkenn

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“…11 For a classic statement of this view, see Lewis (1986b), postscript B. 12 Similar examples can be found, e.g., in Tichý 1976, andBennett 2003, ch. 15.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 83%

Causation: Determination and Difference‐Making

Kment

2010

Nous

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In his classic discussion of causation, David Hume introduced two ideas that have shaped much of the philosophical debate on the topic since then. The first may be calledThe determination idea. Causes determine that their effect obtains. If the causes of E obtain, then E inevitably obtains as well.Hume seems to have taken it for granted that we ordinarily associate the idea of causation with that of a special tie or link between the causes and the effect in virtue of which the causes determine that the effect obtains, a 'necessary connexion,' as Hume calls it. He famously maintained that this idea of a tie is not based on any impression of such a connection, and that the only thing in the objects that could have given rise to it (by way of generating an association in the mind) is the constant conjunction of certain types of matters of particular fact. That train of thought yielded his definition of causation as constant conjunction. Descendants of this account were popular for a long time. Recent versions typically add the thought that the regularity in question must obtain as a matter of law. That is to say, the obtaining of matters of particular fact that are relevantly similar to the causes nomically determines (is nomically sufficient for) the obtaining of some matter of particular fact that is relevantly similar to the effect. (This view can be combined with a non-Humean theory of lawhood, and thus be divorced from its Humean origins.)The other important idea about causation is introduced by Hume without stage-setting or obvious connection to the rest of the text. In the Enquiry, at the end of the section that deals with causation, Hume states his regularity account thus: C 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 80 Causation: Determination and Difference-Making 81. . . we may define cause to be an object followed by another, and where all the objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second.To the surprise of the reader, the passage continues:Or, in other words, where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed. 1The second formulation introduces a new idea, by no means identical with the one expressed by the first definition. We may call itThe difference-making idea. A cause makes a difference to whether its effect obtains: without it, the effect would not have obtained.This idea, too, is undeniably central to our thinking about causation. That is most clearly manifested in the methods we use to evaluate causal claims. The difference-making idea underlies John Stuart Mill's method of difference (Mill 1956, BK. III, ch. VIII, sct. 2), as the name of the method already suggests. Consider how Mill's procedure is applied in the controlled experiments of science. As you manipulate the independent variable while controlling for other relevant factors, the value of the dependent variable changes. So, the value of the first variable makes a difference to the value of the second. There must therefore be a causal connection. Controlled experiments are frequently hailed as the fo...

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“…The problem of so called Morgenbesser betting counterfactuals-assertions of If I had bet on heads, I would have won, where an indeterministic coin has landed heads-is examined by bennett (1984, 2004), barker (1998, 1999) and pavel Tichý (1976a).…”

Section: Counterfactuals and Subjunctivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand (Second Edition)

Oppy¹,

Trakakis²

2014

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A counterexample to the Stalnaker-Lewis analysis of counterfactuals

Cited by 79 publications

References 1 publication

Morgenbesser’s Coin, Counterfactuals, and Causal Versus Probabilistic Independence

Morgenbesser’s Coin, Counterfactuals, and Causal Versus Probabilistic Independence

Causation: Determination and Difference‐Making

A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand (Second Edition)

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