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Langsam, Harold

doi:10.1023/a:1002994402591

Cited by 47 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 16 publications

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“…But perhaps we just need to be more creative. According to Langsam (1997), some visual hallucinations are relations to empty space. Similarly, Alston (1999) briefly entertains the hypothesis that Macbeth is related to the air in front of his face when he hallucinates a dagger.…”

Section: Illusionismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mundane hallucinations and new wave relationalism

Beck

2021

Nous

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Relationalism maintains that mind‐independent objects are essential constituents of veridical perceptual experiences. According to the argument from hallucination, relationalism is undermined by perfect hallucinations, experiences that are introspectively indistinguishable from veridical perceptual experiences but lack an object. Recently, a new wave of relationalists have responded by questioning whether perfect hallucinations are possible: what seem to be perfect hallucinations may really be something else, such as illusions, veridical experiences of non‐obvious objects, or experiences that are not genuinely possible. This paper argues that however well new wave relationalism may handle brains in vats, drug users “seeing” pink elephants, and other extraordinary hallucinations, it struggles to accommodate mundane hallucinations, such as “hearing” your child cry out from the room down the hall when she is actually sound asleep or “feeling” vibrations on your thigh even when your phone isn't in your pocket. Mundane hallucinations are best explained as byproducts of noise in the perceptual system, and noise‐induced hallucinations are resistant to the strategies that new wave relationalists deploy to explain away other hallucinations. Mundane hallucinations can thus underpin an especially powerful version of the argument from hallucination.

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Section: Illusionismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mundane hallucinations and new wave relationalism

Beck

2021

Nous

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Implications of Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions for Relationalism, Disjunctivism, and Representationalism About Perceptual Experience

Bourget

2018

Erkenn

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According to some authors, perceptual ascriptions such as "Jones sees an F" are sometimes intensional, in that they can be true without there being an F. 1 The claim that there are intensional perceptual ascriptions (or IPAs) is not without opponents, but the critics' arguments are addressed in a recent article in this journal (Bourget 2017a). In this paper, I take it as read * Forthcoming in Erkenntnis.

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Disjunctivism and the Causal Conditions of Hallucination

Moran

2022

Erkenn

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Disjunctivists maintain that perceptual experiences and hallucinatory experiences are distinct kinds of event with different metaphysical natures. Moreover, given their view about the nature of perceptual cases, disjunctivists must deny that the perceptual kind of experience can occur during hallucination. However, it is widely held that disjunctivists must grant the converse claim, to the effect that the hallucinatory kind of experience occurs even during perception. This paper challenges that thought. As we will see, the argument for thinking that the hallucinatory kind of experience is present even in cases of perception depends on prior acceptance of a ‘non-demanding’ conception of hallucination, on which all it takes to produce an hallucinatory experience is to induce in the subject the right kind of neurological condition. On the view developed here, by contrast, there are substantive causal conditions, going beyond the mere occurrence of the right kind of neurological state, that must be met if an experience of the hallucinatory kind is to occur. By drawing on this view, I argue, disjunctivists can deny that the kind of experience involved in hallucination ever occurs during perception. This then allows disjunctivists to avoid certain important problems they would otherwise face. It also leaves them with considerably more freedom when it comes to theorising about the nature of hallucinatory experience.

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Cited by 47 publications

References 16 publications

Mundane hallucinations and new wave relationalism

Mundane hallucinations and new wave relationalism

Implications of Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions for Relationalism, Disjunctivism, and Representationalism About Perceptual Experience

Disjunctivism and the Causal Conditions of Hallucination

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