Construct validity of behavioral models of anxiety: Where experimental psychopathology meets ecology and evolution.

Abstract

In experimental psychopathology, construct validity is usually enhanced by addressing theories from other fields in its nomological network. In the field of anxiety research, this construct is related to antipredator behavior, conserved across phylogeny in its functions and neural basis, but not necessarily on its topography. Even though the relations between behavioral models of anxiety and statements from behavioral ecology and evolutionary biology are commonly made in anxiety research, these are rarely tested, at least explicitly. However, in order to increase construct validity in experimental anxiety, testing predictions from those theories is highly desirable. This article discusses these questions, suggesting a few ways in which behavioral ecological and evolutionary hypotheses of anxiety-like behavior may be tested.

The Aversive Brain System of Teleosts: Implications for Neuroscience and Biological Psychiatry

“…The present review suggests some of the regions involved and presents a roadmap and framework for future research. The evolutionary relevance is clear, but it is also important to consider the implications of these findings for work in the field of behavioral models and experimental psychopathology: establishing homologies between regions involved in similar behavior strengthens the hypotheses that these behaviors are indeed conserved, an assumption of most models that is rarely tested (Maximino et al, 2010b) and of which depends the construct validity of these models.…”

Non-mammalian models in behavioral neuroscience: consequences for biological psychiatry

“…In fact, the definition of an animal model as an experimental preparation is neutral with regard to the extension of what is being modeled and to which species is targeted (Wright, 2002 ). Nonetheless, most assumptions of model organism research also inform animal modeling (Kalueff et al, 2008 ; Maximino et al, 2010c ; de Mooij-van Malsen et al, 2011 ; Kas et al, 2011 ; Stewart and Kalueff, 2014 ). While the aspects of pharmacological isomorphism, ethological consistency, and symptomatology are central to reasoning with animal models (Willner, 1991 ; van der Staay, 2006 ; Kalueff et al, 2007 ; Belzung and Lemoine, 2011 ), “[t]he arguments for evolutionary relationships, genetic homologies, and physiological similarities also are part of the epistemic infrastructure that supports the use of animal models” (Nelson, 2012 , p. 16).…”

“…While the aspects of pharmacological isomorphism, ethological consistency, and symptomatology are central to reasoning with animal models (Willner, 1991 ; van der Staay, 2006 ; Kalueff et al, 2007 ; Belzung and Lemoine, 2011 ), “[t]he arguments for evolutionary relationships, genetic homologies, and physiological similarities also are part of the epistemic infrastructure that supports the use of animal models” (Nelson, 2012 , p. 16). In particular, some authors (Blanchard and Blanchard, 1988 ; Maximino et al, 2010c ; de Mooij-van Malsen et al, 2011 ; Kas et al, 2011 ; Stewart and Kalueff, 2014 ) advocate the use of species-specific behavioral and physiological phenotypes as endpoints for assessing the effects of manipulations across multiple species. This, of course, necessitates the model to be embedded in a theoretical framework which will guide the choice of endpoints to be analyzed and validated (McNaughton and Zangrossi, 2008 ; Maximino et al, 2010c ).…”

“…In particular, some authors (Blanchard and Blanchard, 1988 ; Maximino et al, 2010c ; de Mooij-van Malsen et al, 2011 ; Kas et al, 2011 ; Stewart and Kalueff, 2014 ) advocate the use of species-specific behavioral and physiological phenotypes as endpoints for assessing the effects of manipulations across multiple species. This, of course, necessitates the model to be embedded in a theoretical framework which will guide the choice of endpoints to be analyzed and validated (McNaughton and Zangrossi, 2008 ; Maximino et al, 2010c ).…”

“…While this assumption is essential for projecting even rodent data toward humans, it has not been tested for most behavioral domains which are relevant for biological psychiatry (Panksepp et al, 2002 ; Pollen and Hofmann, 2008 ). It has been argued that, at least in anxiety research, construct validity is dependent on the assumption of evolutionary conservation (Maximino et al, 2010c ); thus, to increase construct validity in animal models, testing the predictions of this assumption is highly desirable (McNaughton and Zangrossi, 2008 ). In this sense, while a common practice in behavioral neuroscience, using data from a single species (no matter how basal) to infer the ancestral state is unfeasible (Garland, 2001 ).…”