Afirmando o conseqüente: uma defesa do realismo científico (?!)

Chibeni, Silvio Seno

doi:10.1590/s1678-31662006000200004

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 22 publications

(4 reference statements)

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“…Porém, o NMA, sobretudo como expõe Psillos (1999), é considerado como uma meta-abdução que busca explicar especificamente o sucesso preditivo das teorias científicas. Assim, a tarefa explicativa da hipótese realista é diferente daquela das teorias científicas, como é destacado por Chibeni (2006) e Ghins (2002). Desse modo, parece questionável que o PANC de fato atinja o NMA.…”

Section: Análise Da Objeção De Stanfordunclassified

O problema das Alternativas Não Concebidas é eficaz contra a defesa abdutiva do realismo científico?

Esteves

Rodrigues

2022

Perspec. Filos.

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O debate acerca do realismo científico trata da relação entre as nossas melhores teorias científicas e o mundo. Nesse debate, o que está em discussão é, sobretudo, se existe uma razão para acreditarmos que as partes de nossas teorias científicas que tratam de fenômenos e entidades inobserváveis se referem, ainda que de modo aproximado, a fenômenos e entidades reais. Diante disso, os realistas defendem a tese de que nossas melhores teorias científicas são aproximadamente verdadeiras. Em 1975, o filósofo Hilary Putnam propôs um argumento a favor do realismo científico, considerando que o realismo “(…) é a única filosofia que não faz do sucesso da ciência um milagre.” (PUTNAM, 1975, p. 73). Esse argumento ficou conhecido como o Argumento do Milagre, sendo parte da estratégia chamada de defesa abdutiva do realismo científico. Em seu livro Exceeding our grasp (2006), Kyle Stanford desenvolve o que considera como um novo desafio a essa estratégia de defesa realista. O objetivo do presente trabalho consiste em analisar se essa objeção de Stanford é plausível contra a defesa abdutiva do realismo científico.

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Section: Análise Da Objeção De Stanfordunclassified

O problema das Alternativas Não Concebidas é eficaz contra a defesa abdutiva do realismo científico?

Esteves

Rodrigues

2022

Perspec. Filos.

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“…We can indeed understand the form of a deductive fallacy here, namely, the fallacy of affirming the consequent. 6 But more important is to notice that inquiry begins with the observation of something that appears as striking, something not agreeable to what is expected, interrupting an habit of expectation. The business of inquiry is to inquiry into those phenomena, to devise an explanatory hypothesis to give an account of such "wondering".…”

Section: Types Of Inductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But this approach is not untroubled. We cannot deal with this theme here, but the reader will find some discussion of it in[5] and[6]. But let us remember that Peirce's theory is broader in scope than a methodological theory of scientific explanations.…”

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The Method of Scientific Discovery in Peirce’s Philosophy: Deduction, Induction, and Abduction

Rodrigues

2011

Log. Univers.

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In this paper we will show Peirce's distinction between deduction, induction and abduction. The aim of the paper is to show how Peirce changed his views on the subject, from an understanding of deduction, induction and hypotheses as types of reasoning to understanding them as stages of inquiry very tightly connected. In order to get a better understanding of Peirce's originality on this, we show Peirce's distinctions between qualitative and quantitative induction and between theorematical and corollarial deduction, passing then to the distinction between mathematics and logic. In the end, we propose a sketch of a comparison between Peirce and Whitehead concerning the two thinkers' view of mathematics, hoping that this could point to further inquiries. Mathematics Subject Classification (2010). Primary 03A10; Secondary 00A30.In natural science this rigid method is the Baconian method of induction, a method which, if consistently pursued, would have left science where it found it. What Bacon omitted was the play of free imagination, controlled by the requirements of coherence and logic. The true method of discovery is like the flight of an aeroplane. It starts from the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin air of imaginative generalization; and it again lands for renewed observation rendered acute by rational interpretation. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality.

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Investigando o desconhecido: filosofia da ciência e investigação de fenômenos "anômalos" na psiquiatria

Chibeni¹,

Moreira‐Almeida²

2007

Rev. psiquiatr. clín.

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Background: Scientific research on controversial subjects, such as spirituality-and-health, raises several issues about scientific activity that should be properly clarified for an adequate conduction of the investigations. Objectives: To highlight some topics of philosophy of science that can be useful in the exploration of unknown, or poorly known, aspects of reality. Methods: By reviewing briefly the concepts of paradigm, normal science and scientific revolution, introduced by Thomas Kuhn, we discuss a set of criteria for evaluating scientific hypotheses, and present some general epistemological guidelines for the scientific exploration of new fields. Results: Scientific activity should be based on theories exhibiting empirical adequacy, falseability, predictive accuracy, broadness of scope, simplicity, theoretical integration, theoretical ordering, and capacity to predict new kinds of phenomena. The proposed guidelines are: to take experimental findings seriously, even when they do not fit into the current paradigm; to search for a theory capable of guiding investigation; to avoid both the dogmatic rejection and the hasty acceptance of new hypotheses; and, in theory evaluation, to take care in not attributing undue value to the context in which the theory was first conceived, or to the authority of the persons who profess or reject it. Conclusion: The scientific exploration of new areas is rendered more fruitful by a thorough understanding of the nature of scientific activity, specially of what Kuhn has called "extraordinary science" (in contrast with "normal science").

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Afirmando o conseqüente: uma defesa do realismo científico (?!)

Cited by 3 publications

References 22 publications

O problema das Alternativas Não Concebidas é eficaz contra a defesa abdutiva do realismo científico?

O problema das Alternativas Não Concebidas é eficaz contra a defesa abdutiva do realismo científico?

The Method of Scientific Discovery in Peirce’s Philosophy: Deduction, Induction, and Abduction

Investigando o desconhecido: filosofia da ciência e investigação de fenômenos "anômalos" na psiquiatria

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