History and Philosophy of Science: a Phylogenetic approach

Lennox, James G.

doi:10.1590/s0104-59702001000400008

Cited by 16 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…The flowering (particularly on the continent) of work inspired by Newton's Opticks is an important context from which to view his earlier optical papers. This approach dovetails nicely with Jim Lennox's 'phylogenetic' account of the relationship between history and philosophy (Lennox 2001). Where Chalmers emphasizes how later times can tell us what to care about in earlier times, Lennox points out that understanding later timesparticularly contemporary scientific disputes-in terms of their histories, aids in untangling the conceptual confusions bequeathed by that history.…”

Section: Hasok Chang Argues That Understanding History Requires the Development Of New Philosophical Conceptsmentioning

confidence: 83%

Frameworks for Historians and Philosophers

Currie¹,

Walsh²

2019

HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History

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The past can be a stubborn subject: it is complex, heterogeneous and opaque. To understand it, one must decide which aspects of the past to emphasise and which to minimise. Enter frameworks. Frameworks foreground certain aspects of the historical record while backgrounding others. As such, they are both necessary for, and conducive to, good history as well as good philosophy. We examine the role of frameworks in the history and philosophy of science and argue that they are necessary for both forms of enquiry. We then suggest that the right attitude towards frameworks is pluralism rather than monism: there is no single correct framework to be applied to a given scientific episode. Rather, a multitude of different frameworks are more or less appropriate given various contexts and aims. From this perspective, good frameworks generate and further, rather than frustrate, historical and philosophical enquiry.Our view sheds light on historical disagreement, and on the relationship between philosophy and history of science.

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Section: Hasok Chang Argues That Understanding History Requires the Development Of New Philosophical Conceptsmentioning

confidence: 83%

Frameworks for Historians and Philosophers

Currie¹,

Walsh²

2019

HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History

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“…James Lennox (2001), like myself, denies that '… the history of science is a sort of 'inductive data base' to be used as confirmation for various philosophical views about science (656).' He reacts by restricting the scope of philosophy, taking himself to be drawing on historical cases in order to understand the foundational issues of a particular science in terms of its origins: … the activity of understanding foundational problems in biology through a study of the historical origins and development of those problems.…”

Section: A 'Natural History' Of Science?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Philosophy of Science and the Curse of the Case Study

Currie¹

2015

The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods

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We can divide the philosophy of science into two projects. Let's call the first philosophydirected. Here, we seek to describe, systematize and explain scientific practice, and draw on this to argue for philosophical positions. Science informs philosophy. 2 The second could be named science-directed. We aim to clarify, clean-up and unify scientific concepts. Philosophy informs science 3. Both projects lean on generalizations about scientific method, practice, development and so on. Frequently, such generalizations are made in reference to case studies, particular, detailed descriptions of scientific activity. Here, I defend the use of case studies in both philosophy-directed and science-directed contexts. My defence is pluralistic: case studies play a variety of roles in philosophical methodology, and particular case studies act in more than one. These roles fall into three categories. First, we take case studies as inductive evidence. As we shall see, due to the heterogeneity of scientific practice, this can lead to a 'natural history' of science: philosophers ought to restrict themselves to detailed studies of particular scientific practices and refuse to posit generalizations. I resist both that science is so heterogeneous, and that philosophy of science need be so particularist. Second, case studies play a non-justificatory, pragmatic or perhaps rhetorical role. For example, referring to the same case study can centre dispute, providing philosophers common ground. I argue that overemphasizing the heuristic use of case studies can undermine them. The third 1 An early version of this paper was presented at PBDB7. Drafts were read by Marc Ereshefsky, Kirsten Walsh, Brandon Holter, Chris Daly and Alex Prescott-Couch. Their feedback is greatly appreciated. 2 Alex Prescott-Couch has suggested to me that philosophy-directed projects be divided again: one project aims to explain scientific practice, where the other draws on science to inform philosophical debate. 3 Godfrey-Smith (2009) makes a similar distinction, naming the 'science-directed' philosophy 'philosophy of nature'. 2. The Curse Here's a paper-schema philosophers will be familiar with. First, introduce some philosophical issue; second, launch into a detailed description some scientific endeavour; third, draw some general lessons on the original issue. In essence, I'm going to argue in support of that strategy. Why does it need support? Because prima facie, there's something problematic about how philosophers of science use case studies. At least one of our tasks is to generalize across scientific practice, and case studies don't help. The 'curse of the case study', then, is that case studies, by their nature, are peculiar and individual, but the generalizations philosophers seek are broad and unitary. On the face of it, we should switch our aims to suit our evidence, or switch our methodology to suit our aims. I'll start by providing some examples of the practice, before describing the problem. Note that I will be drawing on examples of philosophy-directed...

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“…Some historically minded philosophers argue forcefully for this. James Lennox (2001), like myself, denies that ' ... the history of science is a sort of 'inductive data base' to be used as confirmation for various philosophical views about science' (656). He reacts by restricting the scope of philosophy, taking himself to be drawing on historical cases in order to understand the foundational issues of a particular science in terms of its origins: '[ ... ] the activity of understanding foundational problems in biology through a study of the historical origins and development of those problems' (657).…”

Section: A 'Natural History' Of Science?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods

Daly¹

2015

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History and Philosophy of Science: a Phylogenetic approach

Cited by 16 publications

References 9 publications

Frameworks for Historians and Philosophers

Frameworks for Historians and Philosophers

Philosophy of Science and the Curse of the Case Study

The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods

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