The economic and environmental impact of trade in forest reserve obligations: a simulation analysis of options for dealing with habitat heterogeneity

Abstract

A tradeable development rights (TDR) program focusing on biodiversity conservation faces a crucial problem: defining which areas of habitat should be considered equivalent. Restricting the trading scope to a narrow area could boost the range of biodiversity conserved but could increase the opportunity cost of conservation. The issue is relevant to Brazil, where TDR-like policies are emerging. Long-standing laws require each rural property to maintain a legal forest reserve (reserva legal) of at least 20%, but emerging policies allow some tradeability of this obligation. This paper uses a simple, spatially explicit model to simulate a hypothetical state-level program. We find that wider trading scopes drastically reduce landholder costs of complying with this regulation and result in environmentally preferable landscapes.<br>Programas que tenham por objetivo desenvolver um mercado de Direitos Especiais de Propriedade (DEP) enfrentam um problema fundamental, qual seja a definição de áreas de preservação equivalentes. Caso a definição seja por um conceito muito restritivo, poderá ocorrer uma maior conservação da biodiversidade, porém com um aumento do custo de oportunidade da preservação ambiental. O assunto é relevante para o Brasil onde programas semelhantes aos DEP estão surgindo. A legislação exige que cada propriedade rural mantenha pelo menos 20% de sua área na forma de florestas (reserva legal), porém algumas políticas nascentes já permitem tipo de negociação de Direitos. Este trabalho usa um modelo espacial simples para simular o efeito de um programa hipotético implantado em um estado. O principal resultado é que uma política menos restritiva para a comercialização dos DEP reduz de forma expressiva, para os produtores rurais, os custos de cumprir a legislação e leva a soluções preferíveis sob o ponto de vista ambiental

Challenges to the Expansion of Ethanol Production in Brazil

“…The results showed that less than 20% of all properties fulfilled the requirements of the environmental legislation and only 13% of the agricultural properties. This coincides with the results of the study by Chomitz et al (2005) that related the no compliance of the land owner with the legal reserve obligation. Fisher et al (2008) also perceive the risk deriving from lack of environmental control.…”

Brazil’s Market for Trading Forest Certificates

“…g . [ 5 ], [ 6 ]). These studies provide a starting point for discussion of the CRA market in Brazil.…”

The sustainability of Brazilian ethanol—An assessment of the possibilities of certified production

“…However, there are various sections of legislation that affect the availability of land for this production, particularly the forest code (FC). The FC requires each land owner to maintain a proportion of each property under natural vegetation as a legal forest reserve (20% in SP), but many land owners are out of compliance with the legal reserve obligation [43]. Recently, landholders are allowed to satisfy the requirement for one property through a legal forest reserve located on another (2001, Decree 2166-67).…”