Imposto inflacionário e transferências inflacionárias no Mercosul e nos Estados Unidos

Cysne, Rubens Penha; Coimbra-Lisboa, Paulo C.

doi:10.1590/s0101-41612007000200002

“…Inflation Tax (LHS) M1 / GDP Annual Inflation (RHS) Source: Cysne (2004) GDP in revenues 13 , a third of the total. This revenue source all but disappeared after the Real Plan stabilized inflation.…”

Section: Inflation Transfers To Commercial Banks (Lhs)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Bye, bye financial repression, hello financial deepening: The anatomy of a financial boom

Mello

¹

,

García

²

2012

The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may Department of Economics -PUC-Rio Abstract:Since the conquest of hyperinflation, with the Real Plan, in 1994, the Brazilian financial system has grown from early infancy to late adolescence. We describe the process of maturing with emphasis on the defining features of the Brazilian financial system over the last 20 years: 1) stabilization and the subsequent financial crisis; 2) universality of banks; 3) market segmentation through public lending; 4) institutional improvement. Further paraphrasing Díaz-Alejandro (1984), we raise some hypotheses on why, this time, the financial boom has not (at least yet) turned into a financial crash.JEL Codes: G21; G28; G32

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“…This framework has also the advantage of providing a technical and precise definition of hyperinflation (see Barbosa et al, 2006), in contrast to the usual ad hoc definition, due to Cagan, which considers hyperinflation monthly inflation rates above 50%. 3 The annual inflation tax revenue data comes from Cysne and Lisboa (2004). 4 This could matter empirically, since low degrees of freedom might be one important factor behind the wide range of empirical estimates shown above, given that German hyperinflation lasted only a few months.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bubble, Weak and Strong Hyperinflation: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Barbosa¹

2016

Exploring the Mechanics of Chronic Inflation and Hyperinflation

0

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThis paper presents a theoretical framework that allows a taxonomy of hyperinflation, namely: (i) bubble, (ii) weak and (iii) strong hyperinflation. The inflation tax revenue curve is used to characterize each type of hyperinflation and we use this curve to test them. The bubble and strong hyperinflation hypotheses are rejected using Brazilian data. The weak hyperinflation hypothesis is not rejected and the economy could have been on the 'wrong' side of the Laffer curve during hyperinflation. This outcome, contrary to conventional wisdom, is predicted by this hypothesis, which presents a solution to an old puzzle of the hyperinflation literature. © 2015 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. ResumoEste trabalho apresenta um arcabouço teórico que permite uma taxonomia da hiperinflação. Ela é classificada em três tipos: (i) bolha; (ii) fraca; e (iii) forte. A curva do imposto inflacionário é usada para identificar cada tipo e para testá-las. As hipóteses de hiperinflação forte e de bolha são rejeitadas com dados da economia brasileira. A hipótese de hiperinflação fraca não é rejeitada e a economia poderia estar no "lado errado" da curva de Laffer. Esta ocorrência, uma possibilidade da hipótese de hiperinflação fraca, soluciona um quebra-cabeça antigo da literatura de hiperinflação.

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Banco Nacional: jogo de Ponzi, PROER e FCVS

Barbosa

¹

2008

Rev. Econ. Polit.

2

0

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Banco Nacional: Ponzi game, PROER and FCVS. This paper analyses the causes of the failure of Banco Nacional and the resolution method adopted by the Brazilian central bank. The program (PROER) designed by the central bank and its legal framework allowed the failed bank to buy "defaulted securities", financed by the central bank, and to use them as borrowing collateral. The paper also analyses the private and social costs of this bank failure. Key-words: Bank Failure; resolution method; Central Bank intervention in failing banks. JEL Classification: E58, G21. INTRODUÇÃOO Banco Nacional era um dos maiores bancos privados do país na primeira metade da década dos anos noventa quando sofreu intervenção do Banco Central do Brasil em virtude de sua insolvência. Este trabalho tem como objetivo analisar as origens da insolvência, o método de solução adotado pelo Banco Central do Brasil na intervenção e os custos, privado e social, envolvidos neste processo.O trabalho está organizado em seis seções além desta introdução. A segunda seção trata da intervenção no Regime de Administração Especial Temporária (RAET) pelo Banco Central, que transformou o banco em dois, um "banco bom" e um "banco ruim". A terceira seção mostra os efeitos do jogo de Ponzi do Banco Nacional. A quarta seção descreve as principais características da venda do "banco bom" para o Unibanco. A quinta seção analisa os custos, privado e social, da intervenção. A sexta seção avalia as implicações do método de solução adotado pelo Banco Central do Brasil e a última seção sumaria as conclusões do trabalho.

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Imposto inflacionário e transferências inflacionárias no Mercosul e nos Estados Unidos

Cited by 7 publications

References 4 publications

Bye, bye financial repression, hello financial deepening: The anatomy of a financial boom

Bye, bye financial repression, hello financial deepening: The anatomy of a financial boom

Bubble, Weak and Strong Hyperinflation: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Banco Nacional: jogo de Ponzi, PROER e FCVS

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