Rationality in children: the first steps

Abstract

Not all categorization is conceptual. Many of the experimental findings concerning infant and animal categorization invite.the hypothesis that the subjects form abstract perceptual representations, mental models or cognitive maps that are not composed of concepts.The paper is a reflection upon the idea that conceptual categorization involves the ability to make categorical judgements under the guidance of norms of rationality. These include a norm of truth-seeking and a norm of good evidence. Acceptance of these norms implies willingness to defer to cognitive authorities, unwillingness to commit oneself to contradictions, and knowledge of how to reorganize one' s representational system upon discovering that one has made a mistake. lt is proposed that the cognitive architecture required for basic rationality is similar to that which underlies pretend-play. The representational system must be able to rTl4ke room for separate 'mental spaces in which alternatives to the actual world are entertained. The same feature underlies the ability to understand modalities, time, the appearance-reality distinction, other minds, and ethics. Each area of understanding admits of degrees, and mastery (up to normal adult levei) takes years. But rational concept-management, at least in its most rudimentary form, does not require a capacity to form second-order representations. lt requires knowledge of how to operate upon, and compare, the contents of diff erent mental spaces.

Early cognitive abilities as predictors of later skills and competencies in the context of children's socioeconomic background

“…This is often referred to as Morgan's canon, namely that behavioral outcomes should not readily be interpreted as higher psychological functioning if lower psychological processes explain the phenomenon just as well (e.g., Morgan, 1892). Although not often explicitly stated in infant research, many authors apply this rationale when criticizing interpretations of findings from habituationdishabituation tasks (e.g., Haith, 1998;Tissaw, 2013;Woodfield, 1991). The principle is frequently used in comparative psychology and can be compared to the more abstract concept of Ockham's razor, as both favor parsimonious theoretical explanations of seemingly complex phenomena.…”