2013
DOI: 10.1590/s0101-31572013000400010
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Abstract: The politics of intergovernmental transfers in Brazil. This article examines the political economy of public resources distribution in Brazil's federal system in 1985-2004. We propose an empirical exercise to analyze how the country's federal governments deal with the tradeoff between the provision of material wellbeing to sub-national governments (the states in our study) and the pursuit of political support from the latter. To identify the determinants of the transfer of resources from the federal government… Show more

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Cited by 14 publications
(17 citation statements)
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References 12 publications
(11 reference statements)
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“…According to Brollo and Nannicini (2012) and Ferreira and Bugarin (2007), to mention two examples, in the distribution of discretionary resources, the federal government favors municipal allies of the same party or parties that form the national coalition in power, and this is evident on the eve of elections, corroborating the model of political-budget cycles (see also Soares & Melo, 2016). The same occurs in the transfers to state governments (Amorim & Simonassi, 2013).…”
Section: Distributive Politics and Partisan Alignmentmentioning
confidence: 55%
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“…According to Brollo and Nannicini (2012) and Ferreira and Bugarin (2007), to mention two examples, in the distribution of discretionary resources, the federal government favors municipal allies of the same party or parties that form the national coalition in power, and this is evident on the eve of elections, corroborating the model of political-budget cycles (see also Soares & Melo, 2016). The same occurs in the transfers to state governments (Amorim & Simonassi, 2013).…”
Section: Distributive Politics and Partisan Alignmentmentioning
confidence: 55%
“…The central point of the argument lies in the unequal distribution of preferences and bargaining power between entities at different levels of government (Rodden, 2010). While subnational governments that have more chances to obtain concession from the federal government (because of a significant representation at the national Congress (Amorim & Simonassi, 2013), or capacity to threaten the economy and the territorial unity (Treisman, 1996), the degree of political alignment between levels (as mentioned by the former mayor in the epigraph that illustrates this article), can facilitate negotiations and access to bureaucracy via intraparty channels. Thus, the central government's electoral incentives and factors related to the demand for intergovernmental transfer, are part of the strategies available to subnational governments to raise funds.…”
Section: Distributive Politics and Partisan Alignmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…According to Arretche and Rodden (2004), the distribution of discretionary transfers does not benefit the poorest states, and thus "it is not determined by needs criteria. " In this light, Amorim and Simonassi (2013) and Turgeon and Cavalcante (2014) identify a tendency to maintain interregional inequalities. The transfer of resources to the states seems to be driven more by political factors than the socioeconomic characteristics of the subnational units or criteria to reduce interregional inequalities.…”
Section: Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer Systemmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…Existing studies have attempted to identify this connection, for example Amorim and Simonassi (2013), Arretche and Rodden (2004), Gibson, Calvo and Falleti (2004), Soares and Neiva (2011), and Turgeon and Cavalcante (2014). Among the variables affecting direct intergovernmental transfer decisions, there is consensus among the authors cited that overrepresentation of electoral districts has a considerable effect on the distribution of public funds -that is, the states overrepresented in the legislation are those that receive the most benefit.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%