National Intelligence Systems as Networks: Power Distribution and Organizational Risk in Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa

Abstract

and South Africa. Three questions drive the research: How are the national intelligence systems organized? How is power distributed among organizations in each country? What are the organizational risks? By employing Network Analysis to publicly-available data on intelligence agencies, collegiate bodies, and supervising organizations, authority relations and information flows were mapped. Regarding organizational configuration, similarities were found between India and Russia, as well as between China and South Africa. Brazil differs from the four countries. As for the power distribution, in Russia, Brazil, and India intelligence is subordinated to the government, and shows more centrality in the cases of China and South Africa. Finally, Russia runs the highest risk of having an intelligence system less able to adapt to strategic circumstances, at the same time being the most resilient among the five countries. Likewise, China has the highest risk of a single actor being able to retain information, acting as a gatekeeper. Network Analysis has proved to be a useful approach to promote a comparative research program in the Intelligence Studies field.

No power vacuum: national security neglect and the defence sector in Brazil

“…In 1999, a new intelligence system was created. It was composed of the Brazilian Intelligence System (SISBIN) 20 and its central organization, the civilian-led Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) (Bruneau 2015;Cepik et al 2017a). However, the new system did not mean a rising civilian interest in the topic.…”

“…24 GSI acts practically as the military gatekeeper between ABIN and other organisations and has been led by retired four-star Army general officers since 1995except for a short period during the government of Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) when the 2015 administrative reform removed ministerial status of GSI and placed ABIN under the Government Civil Secretariat (institution that holds ministry status). 25 Differently from ABIN's director, GSI's minister is a military officer that does not have to be approved by Senate hearings, and who is directly appointed by the President (Cepik et al 2017b). As a consequence of the prestigious role at the government, the military-led GSI became a bureaucratic area of dispute between the three military branches-Navy, Army, and Air Force.…”

The Role of Brazilian Intelligence in the Geopolitics of Grandeza (1964-2002)

“…In this regard, it is worth noting that the final scope of intelligence activities, in line with the military ideology of the 1960s and 1970s, was to ensure that the vital Objetivos Nacionais Permanentes (permanent objectives of the nation) were achieved. 10 More than subserviently helping US foreign policy goals against Communism, as argued by some authors, 11 the Brazilian state was to enhance the removal of subversion foci according to national interests. Chaos derived from «red» subversion was considered to be a major obstacle to attain Grandeza.…”

“…This school was answerable directly to the president. It fact, it was the highly sophisticated professionalization of intelligence, under the supervision of the military, what led Brazilian intelligence agencies to play a key role in the national security apparatus (Stepan, 1988, Cepik & Antunes, 2004.…”

“…In 1999, a federal law finally established officially the ABIN, the new Brazilian Intelligence Agency, as the central organ of the Brazilian intelligence system (SISBIN). Cepik (2017) observes that the law that created the SISBIN gave the President the highest level of authority over the system. Since 2002, a further step was accomplished to enhance the control over ABIN activities, putting it under the supervision of the Institutional Security Cabinet (GSI in Portuguese).…”