Alfred Schutz as a critic of social ontological: robinsonades Revisiting his objections to Husserl’s 5th Cartesian meditation

Human beings are embedded in diverse social, cultural and political groups through which we make sense of our technologically mediated lived experience. This article seeks to reaffirm the postphenomenological subject as a primarily social subject. Critics maintain that the current postphenomenological framework does not adequately address the social, cultural and political context in which human-technology relations take place. In recent years, various additions to postphenomenology have been suggested in order to address this contextual deficit. In this article, I argue that a return to the phenomenological roots of postphenomenology reveals underexamined analytical tools that allow for greater socio-cultural and political sensitivity. I take Don Ihde’s supposed macroperceptual and microperceptual divide as a point of departure in claiming that postphenomenology has too hastily turned away from the subject as primarily socially situated. I draw upon the phenomenological tradition, particularly the social phenomenology of Alfred Schutz, to develop a social postphenomenological approach. This approach is informed by the Schutzian notions of action, the stock of knowledge at hand and consociates. In the resulting account, the postphenomenological schema of I—Technology—World is reconstrued as We—Technology—World.

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Alfred Schutz as a critic of social ontological: robinsonades Revisiting his objections to Husserl’s 5th Cartesian meditation

Cited by 5 publications

References 2 publications

Alfred Schutz and the Austrian Schools of Jurisprudence and Economics

Alfred Schutz and the Austrian Schools of Jurisprudence and Economics

The Mundane Dialectic of Enlightenment: Typification as Everyday Identity Thinking

There is no "I" in Postphenomenology

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