Examining the Diversity of Prosocial Behavior: Helping, Sharing, and Comforting in Infancy

Dunfield, Kristen A.; Kuhlmeier, Valerie A.; O’Connell, Laura; Kelley, Elizabeth

doi:10.1111/j.1532-7078.2010.00041.x

Cited by 333 publications

(400 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…This is not only the case in 18-month-old children [7], but also in 2-to 4-year-old children [8]. In addition, longitudinal work across the first years of life reported no THE PLURALITY OF EARLY PROSOCIALITY 4 relation between early helping and later comforting and sharing [9].…”

Section: Dissociations In Early Prosocial Behaviorsmentioning

confidence: 95%

The multidimensional nature of early prosocial behavior: a motivational perspective

Paulus

2018

Current Opinion in Psychology

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A majority of current work indicates that the different types of prosocial behavior in young children (helping, sharing, comforting) are not related to each other. Here, I review recent studies that examined the relations between prosocial actions as well as the antecedents and correlates of the particular domains of prosociality. I argue that in addition to different social-cognitive demands also different motivations are involved in early prosocial action, and that prosociality is thus a concept that encompasses -at least early in development -heterogeneous behaviors and motivations.

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Section: Dissociations In Early Prosocial Behaviorsmentioning

confidence: 95%

The multidimensional nature of early prosocial behavior: a motivational perspective

Paulus

2018

Current Opinion in Psychology

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“…Nevertheless, young children do share their resources under some conditions: for example, if their mother instructs them to do so, or if their partner explicitly requests resources (e.g., Dunfield, Kuhlmeier, O'Connell, & Kelley, 2011;Hay, Caplan, Castle, & Stimson, 1991;Levitt, Weber, Clark, & McDonnell, 1985).…”

Section: B Do Infants Show Sensitivity To Ingroup Support?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In a series of experiments, Dunfield and her colleagues tested 18-month-olds to 4.5-year-olds with scenarios in which an experimenter hit her knee against a table or slammed her finger in a door; she then simulated pain, rubbed the affected area, and vocalized about it. At 18 and 24 months, no infant showed prosocial responding during the 10 seconds that followed the injury (Dunfield et al, 2011). Responding was still slight at 2.5 years of age; it was reliably higher at ages 3.5 and 4.5 and consisted almost exclusively of verbal reassurances (Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, 2013; for related naturalistic observations in daycare settings, see e.g., Howes & Farver, 1987;Lamb & Zakhireh, 1997).…”

Section: Comforting Someone In Distressmentioning

confidence: 99%

Psychological and sociomoral reasoning in infancy.

Baillargeon¹,

Scott²,

He³

et al. 2015

APA Handbook of Personality and Social Psychology, Volume 1: Attitudes and Social Cognition.

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IntroductionConsider the following scene: A man wearing a backpack is pacing leisurely back and forth in a large airport room. As he strolls, he occasionally crosses his arms, twirls the dangling straps of his backpack, or stuffs his hands in his pant pockets. At one point, he sits down, takes off his backpack, and removes from it a bag filled with assorted gummy bears; as he peers intently inside the bag, he selects and eats, one at a time, five red gummy bears.As adults, we would have no difficulty interpreting the man's actions. We might view his initial actions-pacing, crossing his arms, and so on-as intentional (as opposed to accidental) though not as directed toward any particular goal. In contrast, we might perceive his subsequent actions-removing the bag of gummy bears from his backpack and eating five red ones in succession-as both intentional and goal-directed. In analyzing these actions, we might build an explanation that attributes to the man a causally coherent set of motivational and epistemic mental states: He wants to eat gummy bears, he is particularly fond of red ones, and so when he spies one in the bag, he removes it and eats it.Next, consider a new scene: As the man is happily chewing on red gummy bears, he notices a second man approaching who is carrying two heavy suitcases. At this point, our scene might unfold according to different scenarios. In one, the first man greets the second man, offers to carry one of the suitcases, and holds out his bag of gummy bears. In another scenario, the first man continues to watch the second man but makes no move to approach him. In yet another scenario, the first man sticks out a leg to trip the second man, causing him to fall heavily.As adults, we would interpret and evaluate the first man's actions in the three scenarios very differently. In the first scenario, we might infer that the two men have a social group in common: They might be friends, coworkers, or relatives, for example. In the second scenario, we 3 would conclude that the two men are strangers. In both the first and second scenarios, we would view the first man's behavior as acceptable: Offering help and sharing food are expected prosocial behaviors in interactions with ingroup, but not outgroup, individuals. In contrast, the first man's behavior in the third scenario would seem to us beyond the pale: Unprovoked harmful actions, even against outgroup individuals, are generally viewed as unacceptable. We would categorize the first man as an antisocial lout, and we might file away distinctive characteristics as possible markers of a social group to be avoided in the future.Our discussion of the two scenes above illustrates the rich analyses that adults spontaneously engage in when watching others act. What are the developmental origins of these interpretations? Over the past 25 years, there has been a great deal of research on social cognition in infancy. This research can be roughly organized into two sets of questions that map neatly onto the two scenes above. First, when watching an agen...

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“…For example, 15-mo-old infants who chose to share a toy they preferred (compared with a nonpreferred toy or no toy at all) with an experimenter also attended significantly longer to a third-party interaction in which the allocation of resources among conspecifics was unequal (11). However, another body of literature suggests that early prosocial abilities are not necessarily related (12).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Precursors to morality in development as a complex interplay between neural, socioenvironmental, and behavioral facets

Cowell

Decety

2015

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

152

157

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The nature and underpinnings of infants’ seemingly complex, third-party, social evaluations remain highly contentious. Theoretical perspectives oscillate between rich and lean interpretations of the same expressed preferences. Although some argue that infants and toddlers possess a “moral sense” based on core knowledge of the social world, others suggest that social evaluations are hierarchical in nature and the product of an integration of rudimentary general processes such as attention allocation and approach and avoidance. Moreover, these biologically prepared minds interact in social environments that include significant variation, which are likely to impact early social evaluations and behavior. The present study examined the neural underpinnings of and precursors to moral sensitivity in infants and toddlers (n = 73, ages 12–24 mo) through a series of interwoven measures, combining multiple levels of analysis including electrophysiological, eye-tracking, behavioral, and socioenvironmental. Continuous EEG and time-locked event-related potentials (ERPs) and gaze fixation were recorded while children watched characters engaging in prosocial and antisocial actions in two different tasks. All children demonstrated a neural differentiation in both spectral EEG power density modulations and time-locked ERPs when perceiving prosocial or antisocial agents. Time-locked neural differences predicted children’s preference for prosocial characters and were influenced by parental values regarding justice and fairness. Overall, this investigation casts light on the fundamental nature of moral cognition, including its underpinnings in general processes such as attention and approach–withdrawal, providing plausible mechanisms of early change and a foundation for forward movement in the field of developmental social neuroscience.

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Examining the Diversity of Prosocial Behavior: Helping, Sharing, and Comforting in Infancy

Cited by 333 publications

References 45 publications

The multidimensional nature of early prosocial behavior: a motivational perspective

The multidimensional nature of early prosocial behavior: a motivational perspective

Psychological and sociomoral reasoning in infancy.

Precursors to morality in development as a complex interplay between neural, socioenvironmental, and behavioral facets

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