proposed a "constraint attunement hypothesis" to explain the large effects of domain expertise on memory recall observed in a number of task domains. They claimed to have found serious defects in alternative explanations of these effects, which their theory overcomes. Reexamination of the evidence shows that their theory is not novel but has been anticipated by those they criticized and that other current published theories of the phenomena do not have the defects that Vicente and Wang attributed to them. Vicente and Wang's views reflect underlying differences about (a) emphasis on performance versus process in psychology and (b) how theories and empirical knowledge interact and progress with the development of a science.Vicente and Wang (1998) used an ecological approach to explain the "significant correlation between domain expertise and memory recall performance after a very brief exposure time" (p.
33). They claimed that "this constraint attunement hypothesis[CAH] . .. predicts ... a memory expertise advantage in cases in which experts are attuned to the goal-relevant constraints in the material to be recalled and that the more constraint available, the greater the expertise advantage can be" (p. 33) and explains "several findings in the literature [that] have no satisfactory theoretical explanation" (p. 33). We claim that, on the contrary, these findings have already been explained by process theories and the memory advantage has long been understood in terms of its goal relevance.After summarizing Vicente and Wang's (1998) theoretical proposal, we address several errors in their account of past and current research on expertise. We then show why the 10 experiments that Vicente and Wang reviewed do not support CAH unless one adds to it a number of auxiliary assumptions and why they provide better support for the contemporary process theories criticized by Vicente and Wang. Process theories need not wait and have not waited for product theories such as CAH to clear the way for progress.