How To Do Things With Words

Austin, J.L.

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245537.001.0001

Cited by 9,627 publications

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“…Joint attention is thought to facilitate the acquisition of words, a classic example of a coordination equilibrium (see Lewis, 1969). Another class of common-knowledge generators consists of performatives (Austin, 1962;Searle, 1989) and the associated phenomenon of public ceremonies, in which the public utterance of a proposition (e.g., "I now pronounce you man and wife") ratifies a new coordination equilibrium such as a marriage, law, or court decision. Much of our moral psychology, including moral debate and condemnation, generates common knowledge of prohibited actions, which allows people to coordinate aggression toward wrongdoers (DeScioli, Bruening, & Kurzban, 2011;DeScioli & Kurzban, 2013).…”

Section: Broader Implications: Common Knowledge In Social Lifementioning

confidence: 99%

The psychology of coordination and common knowledge.

Thomas¹,

DeScioli²,

Haque³

et al. 2014

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

115

112

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Research on human cooperation has concentrated on the puzzle of altruism, in which one actor incurs a cost to benefit another, and the psychology of reciprocity, which evolved to solve this problem. We examine the complementary puzzle of mutualism, in which actors can benefit each other simultaneously, and the psychology of coordination, which ensures such benefits.Coordination is facilitated by common knowledge-the recursive belief state in which A knows X, B knows X, A knows that B knows X, B knows that A knows X, ad infinitum. We test whether people are sensitive to common knowledge when deciding whether to engage in risky coordination. Participants decided between working alone for a certain profit and working together for a potentially higher profit that they would receive only if their partner made the same choice. Results showed that more participants attempted risky coordination when they and their prospective partner had common knowledge of the payoffs (broadcasted over a loudspeaker) than when they had only shared knowledge (conveyed to both by a messenger) or primary knowledge (revealed to each partner separately). These results confirm the hypothesis that people represent common knowledge as a distinct cognitive category that licenses them to coordinate with others for mutual gain. We discuss how this hypothesis can provide a unified explanation for diverse phenomena in human social life, including recursive mentalizing, performative speech acts, public assemblies and protests, and self-conscious emotional expressions.

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Section: Broader Implications: Common Knowledge In Social Lifementioning

confidence: 99%

The psychology of coordination and common knowledge.

Thomas¹,

DeScioli²,

Haque³

et al. 2014

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

115

112

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Further, it has now reached a satisfactory degree of formaliza-tion after Austin's (1962) and Searle's (1969) pioneering works, thanks to many works grounded in analytic philosophy and logic (e.g., Grice, 1989;Searle & Vanderveken, 1985;Sperber & Wilson, 1986;Strawson, 1964), computational linguistics (e.g., Appelt, 1985;Cohen, Morgan & Pollack, 1980), and artificial intelligence (e.g., Airenti, Bara & Colombetti, 1983;Cohen & Levesque, 1991;Cohen & Perrault, 1979).…”

Section: Cognitive Pragmaticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Neuropragmatics: Neuropsychological Constraints on Formal Theories of Dialogue

Bara¹,

Tirassa²,

Zettin

1997

Brain and Language

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We are interested in the validation of a cognitive theory of human communication, grounded in a speech acts perspective. The theory we refer to is outlined, and a number of predictions are drawn from it. We report a series of protocols administered to 13 brain-injured subjects and to a comparable control group. The tasks included direct and indirect speech acts, irony, deceits, failures of communication, and theory of mind inferences. All the predicted trends of difficulty are consistently verified; in particular, difficulty increases from direct/indirect speech acts to irony, from irony to deceits, and from deceits to failure recovery. This trend symmetrically shows both in the successful situation and in the failure situation. Further, failure situations prove more difficult to handle than the relevant successful situation. In sharp contrast with previous literature, there is no difference between the subjects' comprehension of direct and indirect speech acts. The results are discussed in the light of our theoretical approach.

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“…Third, lying creates belief system conflicts, which can negatively affect a lie teller's mental well-being (Krupfer, 1982). Henceforth, we refer to this perspective on lying and its moral implications as the absolutist position.In contrast, the utilitarian perspective, pioneered by Bentham (1843) and Mill (1869) and further developed by speech act theorists such as Austin (1962) and Sweetser (1987), suggests that the concept of lying and its moral implications are context dependent. Whether a false statement knowingly told to deceive is a lie and whether a lie is morally reprehensible depend on its purpose.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In contrast, the utilitarian perspective, pioneered by Bentham (1843) and Mill (1869) and further developed by speech act theorists such as Austin (1962) and Sweetser (1987), suggests that the concept of lying and its moral implications are context dependent. Whether a false statement knowingly told to deceive is a lie and whether a lie is morally reprehensible depend on its purpose.…”

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confidence: 99%

Cross-cultural differences in children's choices, categorizations, and evaluations of truths and lies.

Cameron

et al. 2007

Developmental Psychology

111

120

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This study examined cross-cultural differences and similarities in children's moral understanding of individual-or collective-oriented lies and truths. Seven-, 9-, and 11-year-old Canadian and Chinese children were read stories about story characters facing moral dilemmas about whether to lie or tell the truth to help a group but harm an individual or vice versa. Participants chose to lie or to tell the truth as if they were the character (Experiments 1 and 2) and categorized and evaluated the story characters' truthful and untruthful statements (Experiments 3 and 4). Most children in both cultures labeled lies as lies and truths as truths. The major cultural differences lay in choices and moral evaluations. Chinese children chose lying to help a collective but harm an individual, and they rated it less negatively than lying with opposite consequences. Chinese children rated truth telling to help an individual but harm a group less positively than the alternative. Canadian children did the opposite. These findings suggest that cross-cultural differences in emphasis on groups versus individuals affect children's choices and moral judgments about truth and deception.Keywords cross-cultural; deception; individualism; collectivism; moral development Children around the world are socialized to adhere to the moral and social value systems of their culture and to do what is seen as right and not what is considered wrong. In many cases, the values of a culture are consistent with each other. They promote a coherent set of morally and socially acceptable behaviors. However, it is not unusual that in some situations certain cultural values collide with each other, and in such a circumstance, a moral-social dilemma Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Kang Lee, Institute of Child Study, University of Toronto, 45 Walmer Road, Toronto, Ontario M5R 2X2, Canada, or to Genyue Fu, School of Education, Zhejiang Normal University, Jinhua, Zhejiang, People's Republic of China. E-mail: kang.lee@utoronto.ca or fugy@zjnu.cn. NIH Public Access NIH-PA Author ManuscriptNIH-PA Author Manuscript NIH-PA Author Manuscript might arise. One such dilemma is whether to tell a lie that may help a group or an individual or to speak the truth that might have the opposite effect.The question of what a lie is and whether it is wrong to lie has been a subject of intense debate among Western philosophers and theologians throughout history. There are numerous schools of thought on the issue that generally fall on a continuum. At one extreme, philosophers such as St. Augustine (1952), Kant (1949), andBok (1978) assumed that lying necessarily involves a speaker who knowingly makes a false statement with the intent to deceive. As long as a statement fits this description, it is a lie regardless of the context in which it is uttered. Also, these theorists held a deontological view of the moral implication of lying: Lying is intrinsically wrong and has a constant disvalue regardless of context. Lies must under all but the mo...

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How To Do Things With Words

Cited by 9,627 publications

References 0 publications

The psychology of coordination and common knowledge.

The psychology of coordination and common knowledge.

Neuropragmatics: Neuropsychological Constraints on Formal Theories of Dialogue

Cross-cultural differences in children's choices, categorizations, and evaluations of truths and lies.

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