Outside directors and CEO turnover

Weisbach, Michael S.

doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90053-0

Cited by 3,546 publications

(2,184 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…• capital market transactions, by reducing the cost of capital-e.g., [35][36][37]; • corporate control, by affecting the managers' turnover-e.g., [38,39]; • stock-based compensation plans, by correcting potential undervaluation-e.g., [40]; • development of litigation hypotheses, in turn impacting on the disclosure behaviors-e.g., [41,42]; • managers' recognition, spreading their talent-e.g., [43]; • competition in product markets, which is the only hypothesis assuming the absence of conflict of interest between management and ownership-see [13,44].…”

Section: Corporate Disclosure and Capital Markets: A Brief Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Disclosure, Materiality, and Integrated Report: An Event Study Analysis

2017

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Within the extensive literature investigating the impacts of corporate disclosure in supporting the sustainable growth of an organization, few studies have included in the analysis the materiality issue referred to the information being disclosed. This article aims to address this gap, exploring the effect produced on capital markets by the publication of a recent corporate reporting tool, Integrated Report (IR). The features of this tool are that it aims to represent the multidimensional impact of the organization's activity and assumes materiality as a guiding principle of the report drafting. Adopting the event study methodology associated with a statistical significance test for categorical data, our results verify that an organization's release of IR is able to produce a statistically significant impact on the related share prices. Moreover, the term "integrated" assigned to the reports plays a significant role in the impact on capital markets. Our findings have beneficial implications for both researchers and practitioners, adding new evidence for the IR usefulness as a corporate disclosure tool and the effect of an organization's decision to disclose material information.

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Section: Corporate Disclosure and Capital Markets: A Brief Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Disclosure, Materiality, and Integrated Report: An Event Study Analysis

2017

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“…However, literature provides mixed findings as most studies indicated positive market reaction (Setiawan 2008;Dahya & McConnell 2005;Huson et al 2004;Kang & Shivdasani 1996;Denis & Denis 1995;Weisbach 1988), while other studies (Ishak & Abdul Latif 2012;Dedman & Lin 2002;Warner et al 1988) reported negative market reaction toward firms' share prices. These inconsistent results could be influenced by how investors' perceived the incoming CEO/MD. The appointment of new CEO may lead to a positive market reaction if the new CEO has new vision and strong aspiration to achieve better performance (Smith 2011); new leadership style (Kang & Shivdasani 1996) and implement new strategies and policies (Pessarossi & Weill 2013).…”

Section: Literature Review and Hypotheses Development The Effect Of Cmentioning

confidence: 97%

Chief Executive Officer/ Managing Director Succession and Value Relevance of Accounting Numbers

Ahmad

Hassan

Jaffar

2016

AJAG

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“…The board is also responsible for the process of hiring, firing, evaluating and compensating the CEO and thus the chairperson should preferably not be the same person whose performance is being assessed (Jensen, 1993). CEO duality is expected to lower the performance because CEOs would gain much power to further their own interests rather than the interests of shareholders (Weisbach, 1988). On the other hand steward theorists accept that managers are good stewards of company resources (Davis et al, 1997).…”

Section: Ceo Dualitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Study on theories and mechanisms of corporate governance

Mishra

Kapil

2017

IJAAPE

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This paper aims to review the theories of corporate governance for understanding the theoretical basis of corporate governance mechanisms. Major theoretical studies on corporate governance, including studies done in emerging economies, are included in the review. The paper looks at corporate governance theories from value creation point of view. It is observed that the two perspectives of corporate governance, i.e., shareholder and stakeholder perspectives, are not in contrast to each other but are pointing towards the same goal, i.e., value creation. However, one points towards value creation for shareholders and the other points towards creation of societal value. While reviewing theoretical underpinnings and assumptions for corporate governance perspectives, due consideration has been given to the development of corporate governance mechanism based on various existing theories. A theoretical framework for understanding the relationship between corporate governance mechanism and corporate performance has been proposed. Emerging challenges for corporate governance theories have also been indicated. This being a review paper, one of the major limitations is an unintentional omission of some literature because of non-availability or non-reachability. Literature that would have been present in languages other than English could also not been included in the review.

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Outside directors and CEO turnover

Cited by 3,546 publications

References 16 publications

Corporate Disclosure, Materiality, and Integrated Report: An Event Study Analysis

Corporate Disclosure, Materiality, and Integrated Report: An Event Study Analysis

Chief Executive Officer/ Managing Director Succession and Value Relevance of Accounting Numbers

Study on theories and mechanisms of corporate governance

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