The heuristic conception of inference to the best explanation

Dellsén, Finnur

doi:10.1007/s11098-017-0933-2

Cited by 21 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 53 publications

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“…Second, we have the heuristic conception, wherein IBE plays a heuristic role for ordinary epistemic agents to approximate Bayesian reasoning. This conception is defended in (McGrew [2003]; Lipton [2004]; Dellsen [2018]). The conclusion of IBE, on the heuristic conception, is a statement that approximates the posterior probability of H as being equal or close to P(H|E).…”

Section: What Is Ibe?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Which Models of Scientific Explanation Are (In)Compatible with Inference to the Best Explanation?

Prasetya¹

2024

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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In this article, I explore the compatibility of inference to the best explanation (IBE) with several influential models and accounts of scientific explanation. First, I explore the different conceptions of IBE and limit my discussion to two: the heuristic conception and the objective Bayesian conception. Next, I discuss five models of scientific explanation with regard to each model's compatibility with IBE. I argue that Philip Kitcher's unificationist account supports IBE; Peter Railton's deductivenomological-probabilistic model, Wesley Salmon's statistical-relevance Model, and Bas van Fraassen's erotetic account are incompatible with IBE; and Wesley Salmon's causal-mechanical model is merely consistent with IBE. In short, many influential models of scientific explanation do not support IBE. I end by outlining three possible conclusions to draw: (1) either philosophers of science or defenders of IBE have seriously misconstrued the concept of explanation, (2) philosophers of science and defenders of IBE do not use the term 'explanation' univocally, and (3) the ampliative conception of IBE, which is compatible with any model of scientific explanation, deserves a closer look.

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Section: What Is Ibe?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Which Models of Scientific Explanation Are (In)Compatible with Inference to the Best Explanation?

Prasetya¹

2024

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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“…For one thing, there is a large and persuasive literature in the philosophy of science detailing situations wherein inquiry may proceed well without scientists believing their claims (e.g. Kapitan, 1992;Dawes, 2013;Cabrera, 2018;Dellsén, 2018;Palmira, 2020, Fleisher, 2020. But over and above this we do not think that bad faith can be required of people.…”

Section: Norms For Public Avowalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Scientific conclusions need not be accurate, justified, or believed by their authors

Dang

Bright

2021

Synthese

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We argue that the main results of scientific papers may appropriately be published even if they are false, unjustified, and not believed to be true or justified by their author. To defend this claim we draw upon the literature studying the norms of assertion, and consider how they would apply if one attempted to hold claims made in scientific papers to their strictures, as assertions and discovery claims in scientific papers seem naturally analogous. We first use a case study of William H. Bragg’s early twentieth century work in physics to demonstrate that successful science has in fact violated these norms. We then argue that features of the social epistemic arrangement of science which are necessary for its long run success require that we do not hold claims of scientific results to their standards. We end by making a suggestion about the norms that it would be appropriate to hold scientific claims to, along with an explanation of why the social epistemology of science—considered as an instance of collective inquiry—would require such apparently lax norms for claims to be put forward.

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“…Otherwise, IBE could not possibly be an autonomous or fundamental form of non‐deductive reasoning, as many of its proponents maintain (e.g., Lycan, 1988; Weintraub, 2013; Poston, 2014). Indeed, incorporating elements from other frameworks of non‐deductive reasoning would also undermine the project of viewing IBE as an accessible heuristic for some other more ideal form of inference, such as Bayesianism (see, e.g., Cabrera, 2017; Bird, 2017; Dellsén, 2018), since the resulting heuristic would thus require the relevant agents to master an entirely different form of reasoning in addition to standard IBE. In particular, if explicating explanatory consolidation required appealing to Bayesian principles or calculations, then IBE would clearly not work as a an accessible heuristic for Bayesian reasoning, since the type of reasoning IBE is meant to help us approximate would then be involved in IBE itself.…”

Section: The Epistemology Of Explanatory Consolidationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Explanatory Consolidation: From ‘Best’ to ‘Good Enough’

Dellsén

2020

Philos Phenomenol Research

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In science and everyday life, we often infer that something is true because it would explain some set of facts better than any other hypothesis we can think of. But what if we have reason to believe that there is a better way to explain these facts that we just haven’t thought of? Wouldn’t that undermine our warrant for believing the best available explanation? Many philosophers have assumed that we can solve such underconsideration problems by stipulating that a hypothesis should not only be ‘the best’ explanation available; rather, it should also be ‘good enough’. Unfortunately, however, the only current suggestion for what it might mean to say that an explanation is ‘good enough’ is, well, not good enough. This paper aims to provide a better account of what is required for an explanatory hypothesis to be considered ‘good enough’. In brief, the account holds that a ‘good enough’ hypothesis is one that has gone through a process that I call explanatory consolidation, in which accumulating evidence and failed attempts to formulate better alternatives gradually make it more plausible that the explanation we currently have is better than any other that could be formulated.

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The heuristic conception of inference to the best explanation

Abstract: Publication informationPhilosophical Studies, : -12

Cited by 21 publications

References 53 publications

Which Models of Scientific Explanation Are (In)Compatible with Inference to the Best Explanation?

Which Models of Scientific Explanation Are (In)Compatible with Inference to the Best Explanation?

Scientific conclusions need not be accurate, justified, or believed by their authors

Explanatory Consolidation: From ‘Best’ to ‘Good Enough’

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