The collection of articles in this special issue provides a comprehensive analysis of European Union decision-making during the Eurozone crisis. We investigate national preference formation and interstate bargaining related to major reforms of the Economic and Monetary Union. The analyses rely on the new 'EMU Positions' dataset. This dataset includes information about the preferences and saliences of all 28 EU member states and key EU institutions, regarding 47 contested issues negotiated between 2010 and 2015. In this introductory article, we first articulate the motivation behind this special issue and outline its collective contribution. We then briefly
The post-2007 financial crisis created an opportunity for reforms that could close the regulatory gap between transnational banks and national bank resolution regimes. During the decade before the crisis, the European Union tried to develop a cross-border bank resolution regime relying on voluntary agreements and complex governance networks. However, these arrangements failed to commit national authorities to multilateral resolution as was exemplified by the case of Fortis. The crisis experience provided the Commission with an opportunity to propose legislation that would either deepen the pre-crisis co-ordinated regime, or replace it with an integrated resolution regime for systemically important cross-border banks. The Commission considered the more ambitious reforms, but after the experience with negotiations over the powers of European Supervisory Authorities, postponed the proposals for an integrated regime until after 2014. The initial round of post-crisis reforms thus remained limited to minimal improvements of the pre-crisis status quo.* Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 2010 ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops in Münster and the 2011 EUSA conference in Boston. I am grateful to Lucia Quaglia, Erik Jones and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
The regime of financial market governance in the European Union evolved from generic comitology 15 years ago into one of the most specialized sectoral regimes today. The initial Lamfalussy reform focused on producing better hard law through open and transparent consultations and supporting its consistent implementation by delegating soft law powers to supervisory committees with independent expert capacity. Under the de Larosière reform, committees were transformed into European Supervisory Authorities and their soft law guidelines 'hardened' into binding technical standards, which later formed the Single Rulebook pillar of the banking union. The successive reforms improved the procedural effectiveness of rule-making, but it is too early to evaluate their effects on implementation because of constant changes. Reforms also made the regime of governance more open and transparent and thus potentially more inclusive. However, the technical nature of financial regulations and the fact that many decisions are made on the global level conspire against improvements in the democratic legitimacy. The reforms thus shifted power toward expert industry insiders.
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