BackgroundVolumetric-modulated arc therapy (VMAT) is a highly sophisticated linear accelerator-based treatment method, and allows dose rate-changing intensity modulation with gantry rotation. We report our clinical experiences with stereotactic body radiation therapy (SBRT) using a respiratory-gated VMAT technique for patients with hepatocellular carcinoma (HCC) when established curative treatments cannot be applied.MethodsA total of 119 patients (139 lesions) with HCC who were treated with SBRT were registered between March 2012 and July 2013 at our institution. A dose of 10–15 Gy per fraction was applied over 3–4 consecutive days, resulting in a total dose of 30–60 Gy.ResultsThe median follow-up period was 25.8 months (range, 3.2–36.8 months). The overall 3-year survival rate was 83.8%. The local control rate at 3 years was 97.0% in all treated lesions. Multivariate analysis revealed that the Child-Pugh class before SBRT had significant effects on overall survival (Child-Pugh A: hazard ratio = 0.463; 95% CI, 0.262–0.817; p = 0.008).ConclusionsSBRT using a respiratory-gated VMAT technique was an excellent ablative treatment modality for patients with HCC. SBRT is a good alternative treatment for patients with small HCCs that are unsuitable for surgical resection or local ablative therapy.Electronic supplementary materialThe online version of this article (10.1186/s12885-018-4340-7) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

How do managers react in an environment where bribery is likely to bring high rewards, but also presents high risks? We examine the supply side (firms' illicit payments) of bribery in a global setting, using the United Nations' (UN) Oil‐for‐Food Program, part of UN sanctions on Iraq. Some companies helped Iraq circumvent UN sanctions through bribe payments in the form of illicit surcharges. Our transaction‐level analysis of factors affecting bribe payments draws on the economic theory of crime, agency theory, and home country institutions. Results suggest that firms pay larger bribes when there are stronger financial and managerial incentives, but pay less when their home countries have implemented the OECD Anti‐Bribery Convention. We find little relationship between a widely used country‐level corruption perception index and firms' actual bribery. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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