We introduce a methodology to construct parsimonious probabilistic models. This method makes use of information filtering networks to produce a robust estimate of the global sparse inverse covariance from a simple sum of local inverse covariances computed on small subparts of the network. Being based on local and low-dimensional inversions, this method is computationally very efficient and statistically robust, even for the estimation of inverse covariance of high-dimensional, noisy, and short time series. Applied to financial data our method results are computationally more efficient than state-of-the-art methodologies such as Glasso producing, in a fraction of the computation time, models that can have equivalent or better performances but with a sparser inference structure. We also discuss performances with sparse factor models where we notice that relative performances decrease with the number of factors. The local nature of this approach allows us to perform computations in parallel and provides a tool for dynamical adaptation by partial updating when the properties of some variables change without the need of recomputing the whole model. This makes this approach particularly suitable to handle big data sets with large numbers of variables. Examples of practical application for forecasting, stress testing, and risk allocation in financial systems are also provided.

Collective behavior provides a framework for understanding how the actions and properties of groups emerge from the way individuals generate and share information. In humans, information flows were initially shaped by natural selection yet are increasingly structured by emerging communication technologies. Our larger, more complex social networks now transfer high-fidelity information over vast distances at low cost. The digital age and the rise of social media have accelerated changes to our social systems, with poorly understood functional consequences. This gap in our knowledge represents a principal challenge to scientific progress, democracy, and actions to address global crises. We argue that the study of collective behavior must rise to a “crisis discipline” just as medicine, conservation, and climate science have, with a focus on providing actionable insight to policymakers and regulators for the stewardship of social systems.

We will need collective action to avoid catastrophic climate change, and this will require valuing the long term as well as the short term. Shortsightedness and uncertainty have hindered progress in resolving this collective action problem and have been recognized as important barriers to cooperation among humans. Here, we propose a coupled social–ecological dilemma to investigate the interdependence of three well-identified components of this cooperation problem: 1) timescales of collapse and recovery in relation to time preferences regarding future outcomes, 2) the magnitude of the impact of collapse, and 3) the number of actors in the collective. We find that, under a sufficiently severe and time-distant collapse, how much the actors care for the future can transform the game from a tragedy of the commons into one of coordination, and even into a comedy of the commons in which cooperation dominates. Conversely, we also find conditions under which even strong concern for the future still does not transform the problem from tragedy to comedy. For a large number of participating actors, we find that the critical collapse impact, at which these game regime changes happen, converges to a fixed value of collapse impact per actor that is independent of the enhancement factor of the public good, which is usually regarded as the driver of the dilemma. Our results not only call for experimental testing but also help explain why polarization in beliefs about human-caused climate change can threaten global cooperation agreements.