In order to evaluate the prevalence of security and privacy practices on a representative sample of the Web, researchers rely on website popularity rankings such as the Alexa list. While the validity and representativeness of these rankings are rarely questioned, our findings show the contrary: we show for four main rankings how their inherent properties (similarity, stability, representativeness, responsiveness and benignness) affect their composition and therefore potentially skew the conclusions made in studies. Moreover, we find that it is trivial for an adversary to manipulate the composition of these lists. We are the first to empirically validate that the ranks of domains in each of the lists are easily altered, in the case of Alexa through as little as a single HTTP request. This allows adversaries to manipulate rankings on a large scale and insert malicious domains into whitelists or bend the outcome of research studies to their will. To overcome the limitations of such rankings, we propose improvements to reduce the fluctuations in list composition and guarantee better defenses against manipulation. To allow the research community to work with reliable and reproducible rankings, we provide TRANCO, an improved ranking that we offer through an online service available at https://tranco-list.eu.
Abstract-Several studies have shown that the network traffic that is generated by a visit to a website over Tor reveals information specific to the website through the timing and sizes of network packets. By capturing traffic traces between users and their Tor entry guard, a network eavesdropper can leverage this meta-data to reveal which website Tor users are visiting. The success of such attacks heavily depends on the particular set of traffic features that are used to construct the fingerprint. Typically, these features are manually engineered and, as such, any change introduced to the Tor network can render these carefully constructed features ineffective. In this paper, we show that an adversary can automate the feature engineering process, and thus automatically deanonymize Tor traffic by applying our novel method based on deep learning. We collect a dataset comprised of more than three million network traces, which is the largest dataset of web traffic ever used for website fingerprinting, and find that the performance achieved by our deep learning approaches is comparable to known methods which include various research efforts spanning over multiple years. The obtained success rate exceeds 96% for a closed world of 100 websites and 94% for our biggest closed world of 900 classes. In our open world evaluation, the most performant deep learning model is 2% more accurate than the state-ofthe-art attack. Furthermore, we show that the implicit features automatically learned by our approach are far more resilient to dynamic changes of web content over time. We conclude that the ability to automatically construct the most relevant traffic features and perform accurate traffic recognition makes our deep learning based approach an efficient, flexible and robust technique for website fingerprinting.
As the web expands in size and adoption, so does the interest of attackers who seek to exploit web applications and exfiltrate user data. While there is a steady stream of news regarding major breaches and millions of user credentials compromised, it is logical to assume that, over time, the applications of the bigger players of the web are becoming more secure. However, as these applications become resistant to most prevalent attacks, adversaries may be tempted to move to easier, unprotected targets which still hold sensitive user data. In this paper, we report on the state of security for more than 22,000 websites that originate in 28 EU countries. We first explore the adoption of countermeasures that can be used to defend against common attacks and serve as indicators of "security consciousness". Moreover, we search for the presence of common vulnerabilities and weaknesses and, together with the adoption of defense mechanisms, use our findings to estimate the overall security of these websites. Among other results, we show how a website's popularity relates to the adoption of security defenses and we report on the discovery of three, previously unreported, attack variations that attackers could have used to attack millions of users.
Due to the numerous data breaches, often resulting in the disclosure of a substantial amount of user passwords, the classic authentication scheme where just a password is required to log in, has become inadequate. As a result, many popular web services now employ risk-based authentication systems where various bits of information are requested in order to determine the authenticity of the authentication request. In this risk assessment process, values consisting of geo-location, IP address and browser-fingerprint information, are typically used to detect anomalies in comparison with the user's regular behavior. In this paper, we focus on risk-based authentication mechanisms in the setting of mobile devices, which are known to fall short of providing reliable device-related information that can be used in the risk analysis process. More specifically, we present a web-based and low-effort system that leverages accelerometer data generated by a mobile device for the purpose of device re-identification. Furthermore, we evaluate the performance of these techniques and assess the viability of embedding such a system as part of existing risk-based authentication processes.
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