Regulatory theory suggests that providing agencies with multiple sanctioning options allows them to dispose promptly of less serious matters and thereby conserve resources to pursue serious offenders. However, agencies dependent on third-party monitoring may have their enforcement agendas skewed toward more trivial violations. We consider these competing expectations by analyzing enforcement actions at the US Federal Election Commission (FEC) from 1999 to 2004. The FEC -an agency heavily dependent on third-party monitoring -expanded its enforcement options in 2000 by creating two new programs to pursue low-level offenders, while leaving its monitoring strategy unchanged. We hypothesized that more sanctioning options would allow the FEC to allocate its resources more efficiently, and thus deal more effectively with the skew created by third-party monitoring. We found instead that although the FEC disposed more promptly of low-level infractions, it was no more effective at focusing on serious violations. Our results suggest that for many agencies, expanding enforcement options without addressing monitoring has limited ability to resolve enforcement problems.
Scholarship suggests the Federal Election Commission lacks adequate enforcement tools to deter those who would violate campaign finance laws. But can and do voters hold political candidates accountable for violating these laws? In this article, we employ two studies to empirically evaluate these questions. The first examines the extent to which media cover campaign finance violations, and how they do so. The second employs an experimental approach to test the effects of such media coverage on evaluations of political candidates, in particular whether knowledge of a candidate’s violation of campaign finance laws erodes voter support. We find that the media are more likely to cover campaign finance impropriety for high-profile offices, when criminal action is alleged, and for most serious violations. We also show that voters care about campaign violations, and certain violations lower voter support similar to other types of political scandal.
Using Justice Department antiterrorism efforts as a case study, this article expands upon existing theories of pretextual prosecution by distinguishing a law enforcement system that employs a pretextual strategy from one that employs what I term technical or disingenuous prosecutions. Contrary to Justice Department claims, the data suggest that since September 2001, federal investigators continually have referred a large number of specious antiterrorism matters to federal prosecutors. The data further suggest that federal prosecutors are more likely to be engaging in technical or disingenuous prosecutions than pretextual prosecutions.
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