Abstract:In spite of the remarkable progress made in the burgeoning field of social neuroscience, the neural mechanisms that underlie social encounters are only beginning to be studied and could -paradoxically-be seen as representing the 'dark matter' of social neuroscience. Recent conceptual and empirical developments consistently indicate the need for investigations, which allow the study of real-time social encounters in a truly interactive manner. This suggestion is based on the premise that social cognition is fundamentally different when we are in interaction with others rather than merely observing them. In this article, we outline the theoretical conception of a second-person approach to other minds and review evidence from neuroimaging, psychophysiological studies and related fields to argue for the development of a second-person neuroscience, which will help neuroscience to really go social; this may also be relevant for our understanding of psychiatric disorders construed as disorders of social cognition.Keywords: mentalizing network; mirror neuron system; social cognition from an interactor's point of view; social cognition from an observer's point of view; 'problem' of other minds; second-person neuroscience 2 "No more fiendish punishment could be devised, were such thing physically possible, than that one should be turned loose in society and remain absolutely unnoticed."William James (1890), The Principles of Psychology.

In this response we address additions to as well as criticisms and possible misinterpretations of our proposal for a second-person neuroscience. We map out the most crucial aspects of our approach by (1) acknowledging that second-person engaged interaction is not the only way to understand others, although we claim that it is ontogenetically prior; (2) claiming that spectatorial paradigms need to be complemented in order to enable a full understanding of social interactions; and (3) restating that our theoretical proposal not only questions the mechanism by which a cognitive process comes into being, but asks whether it is at all meaningful to speak of a mechanism and a cognitive process when it is confined to intra-agent space. We address theoretical criticisms of our approach by pointing out that while a second-person social understanding may not be the only mechanism, alternative approaches cannot hold their ground without resorting to second-person concepts, if not in the expression, certainly in the development of social understanding. In this context, we also address issues of agency and intentionality, theoretical alternatives, and clinical implications of our approach.

is strolling along the beach where he sees a man wearing a brown hat, black sunglasses and a trench coat. He has seen this man several times before in town and his strange and secretive behaviour has made Ralph suspicious. Since the man, let's call him Ortcutt, always tries to cover his face and turns around all the time to see if he is being followed etc., Ralph has come to believe that Ortcutt might be a spy. Since Ralph finds this exciting, he follows him. Now, Ortcutt is in fact a spy and when he turns around and notices Ralph, he starts walking faster, takes his cell phone out of his pocket and makes all kinds of wild gestures while talking to someone. Ralph, in turn, comes to believe that the man in the brown hat believes that Ralph has recognized him as a spy and that his cover has been blown.

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