The intensification of the financial and economic crisis in Europe has added a new impetus into the debate over the possibilities for securing supranational fiscal integration within the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Since the literature on the European Union's (EU) response to the crisis is dominated by the study of intergovernmental politics, this article considers the previously neglected role of the Commission. A framing analysis of the Commission's crisis discourse is operationalised here, which is supplemented by interviews with senior officials located in DG ECFIN during key phases of the crisis. It is found that a supranational reform agenda was never internalised by the Commission. Instead the Commission acted strategically by framing the crisis around intergovernmental fiscal discipline. These findings suggest that, in line with the 'new intergovernmentalist' thesis, supranational institutions themselves may not be as 'hard-wired' towards supranationalism as is often assumed.
The eurozone crisis has reinvigorated the debate over the requirement for supranational integration within the single currency area. With the focus of political scientists often restricted to the study of intergovernmental processes of crisis management, this article considers the role of the European Parliament during the key legislative negotiations on European Union fiscal governance reform. A comparative frame analysis of the major European Union institutions’ crisis discourse is applied. Frames are linked to macroeconomic ideology as well as to different integration scenarios within Economic and Monetary Union. It is found that the European Parliament converged around limited framing devices supporting intergovernmental fiscal discipline. Key explanatory factors here were the ideological divisions among Members of the European Parliament as well as the leadership role played by the European Council. These findings are broadly consistent with the new intergovernmentalist claims that the supranational institutions are no longer hard-wired to the pursuit of supranational integration.
The eurozone crisis provided a new opportunity for obtaining supranational fiscal integration within the European single currency area. This study applies a framing analysis to the crisis discourse that emerged from within the European Union’s intergovernmental forums involved in fiscal policy coordination. As well as linking policy frames to two different integration scenarios for the Economic and Monetary Union, the broader influence of macroeconomic ideology is also emphasised. It is found that the response to the intensification of the crisis in Europe was to employ framing devices supporting intergovernmental fiscal discipline. While there were emergent supranational discourses over the longer term, these were reflective of a limited reform ambition. A key constraining factor here were the sovereignty concerns and issues of moral hazard circulating amongst member states, which together have ensured that a supranational fiscal policy is unlikely to be obtained in Europe
In the literature on member state position-taking in the eurozone crisis, the debate has mainly centred on whether national preferences are shaped exclusively within the domestic setting or influenced by shared EU-level norms or interaction within EU institutions. This article goes beyond this discussion. Drawing on original data collected by the authors, it uses the UK’s experience to test the claims both of society-centred approaches, including liberal intergovernmentalism, and perspectives that emphasise the importance of shared EU norms or interaction. It argues that while the first overlook the role of institutions as both actors and mediating variables in preference formation, the second have so far focused on the experience of eurozone members, thereby raising the possibility of selection bias. Treating eurozone form as a series of processes rather than a single event, it contests the claim that preference formation is always driven by societal interests, highlights instances where government acts in the absence of or contrary to expressed societal interests, and reveals limitations of the shared norms critique of liberal intergovernmentalism. It shows that the UK government was driven by a scholars concern to protect the UK economy from financial contagion rather than solidarity with its European partners.
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