This study extends the findings that young infants prefer prosocial to antisocial others (Hamlin & Wynn, Cognitive Development 2011, 26, 30; Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, Nature 2007, 450, 557) to older infants (12–24 and 24–36 months) with a novel display. We presented infants with short cartoons in which a character (the “Protoganist”) engaged in a ball play with two others, one acting prosocially (the “Giver”), and the other antisocially (the “Keeper”). Afterward, infants were presented with the Giver and the Keeper characters and encouraged to reach for the one of their choices. We found that infants exhibited robust choice for the Giver. In addition, infants' preference for the Giver persisted despite changes in facial features (dark skin, scrambled face). These findings provide further evidence for infant's preference for prosociality.

Research suggests that belief in conspiracy theories (CT) stems from basic psychological mechanisms and is linked to other belief systems (e.g., religious beliefs). While previous research has extensively examined individual and contextual variables associated with CT beliefs, it has not yet investigated the role of culture. In the current research, we tested, based on a situated cultural cognition perspective, the extent to which culture predicts CT beliefs. Using Hofstede's model of cultural values, three nation‐level analyses of data from 25, 19, and 18 countries using different measures of CT beliefs (Study 1, N = 5323; Study 2a, N = 12,255; Study 2b, N = 30,994) revealed positive associations between masculinity, collectivism, and CT beliefs. A cross‐sectional study among U.S. citizens (Study 3, N = 350), using individual‐level measures of Hofstede's values, replicated these findings. A meta‐analysis of correlations across studies corroborated the presence of positive links between CT beliefs, collectivism, r = .31, 95% CI = [.15; .47], and masculinity, r = .39, 95% CI = [.18; .59]. Our results suggest that in addition to individual differences and contextual variables, cultural factors also play an important role in shaping CT beliefs.

In 2007, a study carried out by Hamlin, Wynn, and Bloom provided concrete evidence that infants as young as 6 months were capable of social evaluation, displaying an early preference for agents performing a prosocial behavior. Since then the development of early social abilities to judge other's behavior has been the topic of a growing body of research. The present paper reviews studies conducted between 2007 and 2015 that experimentally examined infants' social evaluation abilities by testing their preference for agents acting prosocially. We performed a detailed analysis of a corpus of 16 research studies including 59 experimental results, scrutinizing their methods and findings, and identifying their convergent and divergent features. This analysis showed that a preference for agents who perform prosocial behaviors (as opposed to antisocial or neutral) was present in a majority of infants, but some conflicting results have also been reported. The rich interpretation that infants are endowed with mature socio-moral evaluation abilities has not really been sufficiently discussed. In order to deepen this debate, we assessed other studies that have further explored infants' understanding of the social value of behaviors. Many of the studies provide evidence that young infants manage to identify and prefer the prosocial agent by taking into account the context and agents' mental states beyond the behavior itself. In this study two specific areas are assessed: (1) studies that have previously explored social evaluation abilities beyond a basic preference for prosocial behavior and (2) current theories which attempt to explain how and why such preferences could exist so early in infancy. Future directions for research on social evaluation abilities in infants are also discussed as well as a review of the literature.

Previous research suggests that unfounded beliefs (UB)-such as conspiracist beliefs and beliefs in the supernatural-stem from similar cognitive and motivational mechanisms. More specifically, it has been demonstrated that cognitive ability is negatively associated with UB but only among individuals who value epistemic rationality. The present study goes beyond previous correlational studies by examining whether the negative association between cognitive ability and UB can be strengthened through a subtle rationality prime. In a large scale online experiment (N = 762 French teachers), we demonstrate that priming rationality (vs. control) does enhance the negative relationship between cognitive ability and adherence to supernatural beliefs, as well as conspiracy mentality (d = 0.2). This effect was not obtained for illusory pattern perception. This study's usefulness as a "proof of concept" for future interventions aimed at reducing UB prevalence among the general public is discussed.

Previous terror management theory research has shown that mortality salience (MS; a death reminder) leads to the derogation of those who are perceived to be threats to or violators of one’s cultural worldview. Immigrants may be viewed as such a threat, but not necessarily to all majority group members of the culture. The studies presented here tested the hypothesis that, depending upon the nature of the participants’ worldview, MS would either increase or decrease liking of an immigrant. After being reminded of their mortality or a control topic, French and American college students evaluated an immigrant. To assess differences in worldview, participants completed a measure of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). Consistent across two studies, MS led to more negative evaluations of an immigrant among those high in RWA, but more positive evaluations for those low in RWA. Discussion focuses on the implications of these findings for understanding the interplay of mortality concerns and RWA in determining attitudes toward immigrants.