The efficiency and level of drug quality supervision are highly related to the distorted or true reporting of new media, and the collusion or non-collusion of third-party testing agencies. Therefore, based on the co-regulation information platform, considering the strategic choices of local government, drug enterprises, third-party testing agencies and new media, this article constructs a four-party evolutionary game model of co-regulation supervision. The stable equilibrium points of each participant's strategic choices are solved. The stability of the strategic combination is analyzed by Lyapunov's first method, and Matlab 2020b is used for simulation analysis to verify the influence of each decision variable on different players' strategic choices. The results show that, firstly, new media's true reporting can make up for the lack of supervision of drug enterprises by local government, and the greater the impact of new media reporting, the more active drug enterprises will be to produce high-quality drugs. Secondly, non-collusion of third-party testing agencies can improve the self-discipline ability of drug enterprises, encourage new media to report truthfully, and play the role of co-regulation supervision. Furthermore, the greater the probability of new media's true reporting, the more local government tend to be stricter, and the probability of strict supervision is positively related to the central government's accountability. Finally, increasing penalty for producing low-quality drugs and collusion will help standardize the behavior of drug enterprises and third-party testing agencies. This article enriches and expands the theoretical basis of the drug quality co-regulation supervision and proposes corresponding countermeasures and suggestions.
Aiming at the dual-channel pharmaceutical supply chain, which consists of two distribution channels, offline medical institutions, and online e-commerce platforms, and taking into account the impact of different strategic choices made by relevant stakeholders on the drugs quality of different distribution channels, this article constructs an evolutionary game model involving the participation of government regulator, pharmaceutical enterprises, medical institutions, and pharmaceutical e-commerce companies. The stable equilibrium points of each participant's strategic choices are solved; the stability of strategic combination is analyzed by Lyapunov's first method, and MATLAB 2020b is used for simulation to verify the influence of each decision variable on the strategic choice of different participants. The results show that, first, the purpose of punishment is to ensure the drugs quality in the pharmaceutical supply chain, but when the fine is too high, it will restrain the economic behavior of pharmaceutical enterprises, which is not conducive to the performance of social responsibilities by other relevant participants. Second, the probability that government regulator strictly supervises the pharmaceutical supply chain and the probability that pharmaceutical enterprises provide high-quality drugs are negatively related to their additional cost. Third, whether medical institutions and pharmaceutical e-commerce companies choose inspection is affected by multiple factors such as inspection cost, sales price, and sales cost. Furthermore, when the penalty for non-inspection of pharmaceutical e-commerce companies is greater than the threshold Fm0, it can ensure that it chooses an inspection strategy. Finally, this article puts forward countermeasures and suggestions on the drugs quality supervision of different distribution channels in the pharmaceutical supply chain.
Considering the government reward and punishment mechanism and the collusion behavior between third-party testing agencies and drug enterprises, based on the coregulation information platform, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of coregulation supervision, which involves the participation of local government, drug enterprises, and third-party testing agencies. The stable equilibrium points of each participant’s strategic choices are solved. The stability of the strategic combination is analyzed by Lyapunov’s first method, and MATLAB 2020b is used for simulation analysis to verify the influence of each decision variable on different players’ strategic choices. The results show that, firstly, the government-increased awards and penalties will promote the integrity of drug enterprises and noncollusion of third-party testing agencies, but it is not conducive to strict performance of regulatory responsibilities by the local government. Secondly, the provision of real drug test reports by third-party testing agencies to the coregulation information platform can supervise drug enterprises and restrict local government to perform its duty. Thirdly, the central government’s punishment to the local government’s dereliction of duty is significant to enhancing the robustness of drug enterprises’ integrity operation. Furthermore, reasonably setting rewards and punishments and perfecting the coregulation information platform will help form a coregulation pattern of government supervision, self-discipline of drug enterprises, and social supervision. Finally, drug quality is highly related to whether drug enterprises operate with integrity. Standardizing coregulation supervision of drug enterprises’ integrity operation is the key to ensuring the safety of the source of drug quality. Therefore, this paper enriches and expands the theoretical basis of the coregulation supervision of drug enterprises’ integrity operation and proposes corresponding countermeasures and suggestions.
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