A key function of the brain is to interpret noisy sensory information. To do so optimally, observers must, in many tasks, take into account knowledge of the precision with which stimuli are encoded. In an orientation change detection task, we find that encoding precision does not only depend on an experimentally controlled reliability parameter (shape), but also exhibits additional variability. In spite of variability in precision, human subjects seem to take into account precision near-optimally on a trial-to-trial and item-to-item basis. Our results offer a new conceptualization of the encoding of sensory information and highlight the brain’s remarkable ability to incorporate knowledge of uncertainty during complex perceptual decision-making.

Change detection is a classic paradigm that has been used for decades to argue that working memory can hold no more than a fixed number of items (“item-limit models”). Recent findings force us to consider the alternative view that working memory is limited by the precision in stimulus encoding, with mean precision decreasing with increasing set size (“continuous-resource models”). Most previous studies that used the change detection paradigm have ignored effects of limited encoding precision by using highly discriminable stimuli and only large changes. We conducted two change detection experiments (orientation and color) in which change magnitudes were drawn from a wide range, including small changes. In a rigorous comparison of five models, we found no evidence of an item limit. Instead, human change detection performance was best explained by a continuous-resource model in which encoding precision is variable across items and trials even at a given set size. This model accounts for comparison errors in a principled, probabilistic manner. Our findings sharply challenge the theoretical basis for most neural studies of working memory capacity.

Visual crowding refers to phenomena in which the perception of a peripheral target is strongly affected by nearby flankers. Observers often report seeing the stimuli as “jumbled up,” or otherwise confuse the target with the flankers. Theories of visual crowding contend over which aspect of the stimulus gets confused in peripheral vision. Attempts to test these theories have led to seemingly conflicting results, with some experiments suggesting that the mechanism underlying crowding operates on unbound features like color or orientation (Parkes, Lund, Angelucci, Solomon, & Morgan, 2001), while others suggest it “jumbles up” more complex features, or even objects like letters (Korte, 1923). Many of these theories operate on discrete features of the display items, such as the orientation of each line or the identity of each item. By contrast, here we examine the predictions of the Texture Tiling Model, which operates on continuous feature measurements (Balas, Nakano, & Rosenholtz, 2009). We show that the main effects of three studies from the crowding literature are consistent with the predictions of Texture Tiling Model. This suggests that many of the stimulus-specific curiosities surrounding crowding are the inherent result of the informativeness of a rich set of image statistics for the particular tasks.

A set of phenomena known as crowding reveal peripheral vision's vulnerability in the face of clutter. Crowding is important both because of its ubiquity, making it relevant for many real-world tasks and stimuli, and because of the window it provides onto mechanisms of visual processing. Here we focus on models of the underlying mechanisms. This review centers on a popular class of models known as pooling models, as well as the phenomenology that appears to challenge a pooling account. Using a candidate high-dimensional pooling model, we gain intuitions about whether a pooling model suffices and reexamine the logic behind the pooling challenges. We show that pooling mechanisms can yield substitution phenomena and therefore predict better performance judging the properties of a set versus a particular item. Pooling models can also exhibit some similarity effects without requiring mechanisms that pool at multiple levels of processing, and without constraining pooling to a particular perceptual group. Moreover, we argue that other similarity effects may in part be due to noncrowding influences like cuing. Unlike low-dimensional straw-man pooling models, high-dimensional pooling preserves rich information about the stimulus, which may be sufficient to support high-level processing. To gain insights into the implications for pooling mechanisms, one needs a candidate high-dimensional pooling model and cannot rely on intuitions from low-dimensional models. Furthermore, to uncover the mechanisms of crowding, experiments need to separate encoding from decision effects. While future work must quantitatively examine all of the challenges to a high-dimensional pooling account, insights from a candidate model allow us to conclude that a high-dimensional pooling mechanism remains viable as a model of the loss of information leading to crowding.