We propose a decentralized combat model for the network-centric warfare. The troops (military units or weapon platforms) of Green (friendly) forces perform their own threat evaluation, decision making, and weapon allocation in order to encounter enemy forces. Although they cooperate with each other for the operational success, their dynamic behavior can be modeled by a set of decentralized optimization problems where each force adopts its best strategy of weapon allocation according to the assessed threat. Adopting the game-theoretic approach, we prove that the dynamic combat model achieves a unique equilibrium at which both forces maintain the balance of fighting strength. Moreover, we study the property of the equilibrium and show that the total weapon consumed by the Green forces is strictly larger than an optimal allocation.
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