Social scientists have explained the rise of suicide bombing since the early 1980s by focusing on the characteristics of suicide bombers, the cultural matrix in which they operate, and the strategic calculations they make to maximize their gains. We offer an alternative approach that emphasizes the interaction between Palestinian suicide bombings and Israeli government actions, analyzing the motivations, organizational rationales and precipitants for the 138 suicide bombings that took place in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza between October 2000 and July 2005. Using several sources, including Arabic newspapers, we find that much of the impetus for Palestinian suicide bombing can be explained by the desire to retaliate against Israeli killings of Palestinians; and that much of the impetus for Israeli killings of Palestinians can be explained by the desire to retaliate for suicide bombings.When men are angry, they commonly act out of revenge, and not ambition. -Aristotle, PoliticsOppressed people cannot always be expected to behave in a reasonable manner.-Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, spiritual founder of Hizballah Explaining Suicide BombingIn April 1993 a suicide bombing took place in the Jordan Valley settlement of Mekhola. It was the first of 20 such attacks over the next four years in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza. Between 1993 and 1997 suicide bombers were responsible for the deaths of 175 people (including 21 suicide bombers) and the injury of 928 others. A second and more lethal wave of suicide bombings began on Oct. 26, 2000. By July 12, 2005, suicide bombers were responsible for the deaths of an additional 657 people (including 148 suicide bombers) and the injury of 3,682 others. Table 1 outlines the annual toll and the grim totals. In the early years of the 211, century, Israel, the West Bank and Gaza became the region of the world with the highest frequency of -and the highest per capita death toll due to -suicide bombing.

This paper uses Gallup poll data to assess two narratives that have crystallized around the 2011 Egyptian uprising: (1) New electronic communications media constituted an important and independent cause of the protests in so far as they enhanced the capacity of demonstrators to extend protest networks, express outrage, organize events, and warn comrades of real-time threats. (2) Net of other factors, new electronic communications media played a relatively minor role in the uprising because they are low-cost, low-risk means of involvement that attract many sympathetic onlookers who are not prepared to engage in high-risk activism. Examining the independent effects of a host of factors associated with high-risk movement activism, the paper concludes that using some new electronic communications media was associated with being a demonstrator. However, grievances, structural availability, and network connections were more important than was the use of new electronic communications media in distinguishing demonstrators from sympathetic onlookers. Thus, although both narratives have some validity, they must both be qualified.

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