The designing, collecting, analyzing, and reporting of psychological studies entail many choices that are often arbitrary. The opportunistic use of these so-called researcher degrees of freedom aimed at obtaining statistically significant results is problematic because it enhances the chances of false positive results and may inflate effect size estimates. In this review article, we present an extensive list of 34 degrees of freedom that researchers have in formulating hypotheses, and in designing, running, analyzing, and reporting of psychological research. The list can be used in research methods education, and as a checklist to assess the quality of preregistrations and to determine the potential for bias due to (arbitrary) choices in unregistered studies.

We conducted preregistered replications of 28 classic and contemporary published findings, with protocols that were peer reviewed in advance, to examine variation in effect magnitudes across samples and settings. Each protocol was administered to approximately half of 125 samples that comprised 15,305 participants from 36 countries and territories. Using the conventional criterion of statistical significance ( p < .05), we found that 15 (54%) of the replications provided evidence of a statistically significant effect in the same direction as the original finding. With a strict significance criterion ( p < .0001), 14 (50%) of the replications still provided such evidence, a reflection of the extremely high-powered design. Seven (25%) of the replications yielded effect sizes larger than the original ones, and 21 (75%) yielded effect sizes smaller than the original ones. The median comparable Cohen’s ds were 0.60 for the original findings and 0.15 for the replications. The effect sizes were small (< 0.20) in 16 of the replications (57%), and 9 effects (32%) were in the direction opposite the direction of the original effect. Across settings, the Q statistic indicated significant heterogeneity in 11 (39%) of the replication effects, and most of those were among the findings with the largest overall effect sizes; only 1 effect that was near zero in the aggregate showed significant heterogeneity according to this measure. Only 1 effect had a tau value greater than .20, an indication of moderate heterogeneity. Eight others had tau values near or slightly above .10, an indication of slight heterogeneity. Moderation tests indicated that very little heterogeneity was attributable to the order in which the tasks were performed or whether the tasks were administered in lab versus online. Exploratory comparisons revealed little heterogeneity between Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) cultures and less WEIRD cultures (i.e., cultures with relatively high and low WEIRDness scores, respectively). Cumulatively, variability in the observed effect sizes was attributable more to the effect being studied than to the sample or setting in which it was studied.

Publication bias threatens the validity of meta-analytic results and leads to overestimation of the effect size in traditional meta-analysis. This particularly applies to meta-analyses that feature small studies, which are ubiquitous in psychology. Here we develop a new method for meta-analysis that deals with publication bias. This method, p-uniform, enables (a) testing of publication bias, (b) effect size estimation, and (c) testing of the null-hypothesis of no effect. No current method for meta-analysis possesses all 3 qualities. Application of p-uniform is straightforward because no additional data on missing studies are needed and no sophisticated assumptions or choices need to be made before applying it. Simulations show that p-uniform generally outperforms the trim-and-fill method and the test of excess significance (TES; Ioannidis & Trikalinos, 2007b) if publication bias exists and population effect size is homogenous or heterogeneity is slight. For illustration, p-uniform and other publication bias analyses are applied to the meta-analysis of McCall and Carriger (1993) examining the association between infants' habituation to a stimulus and their later cognitive ability (IQ). We conclude that p-uniform is a valuable technique for examining publication bias and estimating population effects in fixed-effect meta-analyses, and as sensitivity analysis to draw inferences about publication bias.

Publication bias is a substantial problem for the credibility of research in general and of meta-analyses in particular, as it yields overestimated effects and may suggest the existence of non-existing effects. Although there is consensus that publication bias exists, how strongly it affects different scientific literatures is currently less well-known. We examined evidence of publication bias in a large-scale data set of primary studies that were included in 83 meta-analyses published in Psychological Bulletin (representing meta-analyses from psychology) and 499 systematic reviews from the Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (CDSR; representing meta-analyses from medicine). Publication bias was assessed on all homogeneous subsets (3.8% of all subsets of meta-analyses published in Psychological Bulletin) of primary studies included in meta-analyses, because publication bias methods do not have good statistical properties if the true effect size is heterogeneous. Publication bias tests did not reveal evidence for bias in the homogeneous subsets. Overestimation was minimal but statistically significant, providing evidence of publication bias that appeared to be similar in both fields. However, a Monte-Carlo simulation study revealed that the creation of homogeneous subsets resulted in challenging conditions for publication bias methods since the number of effect sizes in a subset was rather small (median number of effect sizes equaled 6). Our findings are in line with, in its most extreme case, publication bias ranging from no bias until only 5% statistically nonsignificant effect sizes being published. These and other findings, in combination with the small percentages of statistically significant primary effect sizes (28.9% and 18.9% for subsets published in Psychological Bulletin and CDSR), led to the conclusion that evidence for publication bias in the studied homogeneous subsets is weak, but suggestive of mild publication bias in both psychology and medicine.

Because of overwhelming evidence of publication bias in psychology, techniques to correct meta-analytic estimates for such bias are greatly needed. The methodology on which the p-uniform and p-curve methods are based has great promise for providing accurate meta-analytic estimates in the presence of publication bias. However, in this article, we show that in some situations, p-curve behaves erratically, whereas p-uniform may yield implausible estimates of negative effect size. Moreover, we show that (and explain why) p-curve and p-uniform result in overestimation of effect size under moderate-to-large heterogeneity and may yield unpredictable bias when researchers employ p-hacking. We offer hands-on recommendations on applying and interpreting results of meta-analyses in general and p-uniform and p-curve in particular. Both methods as well as traditional methods are applied to a meta-analysis on the effect of weight on judgments of importance. We offer guidance for applying p-uniform or p-curve using R and a user-friendly web application for applying p-uniform.