This study is based on three Irish operational toll road Public Private Partnership (PPP) case studies, including interviews with 38 key stakeholders. Our findings show that the Irish Government's treatment of risk and its transfer to the private partner in PPPs are changing over time. Regulatory changes, which have led to increased finance costs, coupled with a severe global economic crisis, have exacerbated the difficulties in funding PPPs. The goalposts in Irish PPPs appear to be changing in favour of the private partner at the expense of the taxpayers, who are the losers in the PPP game. The Government are suggesting that they may potentially step in, if projects experienced financial difficulty and the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) may require specific guarantees in order to participate in future PPP projects. Pricing of demand risk also differs from the Government's rhetoric that it is being priced realistically. In practice, we find that it is priced aggressively by the SPV in order to win PPP contracts. The paper discusses the possible implications of these findings for Value for Money (VFM) and, ultimately, taxpayers.

Drawing on stakeholder theory, this study seeks to gain an insight into the stakeholder management strategies used by the Procuring Authority in Irish road Public Private Partnerships to manage its complex stakeholder relationships. Based on interviews with 38 key stakeholders the findings of this study indicate that the allocation, transfer and management of risk impact on the quality of stakeholder relationships. A proactive and somewhat accommodating approach is used by the Procuring Authority in its relationship with the Special Purpose Vehicle, while there is some evidence that collaborative relationships exist between the public sector bodies responsible for allocating risk.

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