ResumoEste artigo busca situar a questão do confl ito de deveres enquanto inserida dentro do sistema ético kantiano, admitindo que essa tenha sido uma questão pouco abordada nas obras kantianas. Inicialmente, discutem-se os conceitos centrais de dever e de máxima, para que se adentre com elementos conceituais sufi cientes na problemática. A abordagem kantiana do confl ito de deveres é explicitada através da exposição da passagem da Metafísica dos Costumes, na qual Kant menciona que uma colisão de deveres seria inconcebível em seu sistema ético. É possível notar que o argumento kantiano na presente passagem é vago e baseia-se quase inteiramente no conceito de "fundamentos de obrigação", o qual o autor não elucida claramente. Além disso, os exemplos utilizados na casuística da mesma obra deixam a questão da negação do confl ito em aberto, difi cultando a interpretação. Na tentativa de melhorar esse quadro, explora-se qual a correspondência de tal negação feita por Kant na Metafísica dos Costumes, em suas outras obras éticas: a Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes e a Crítica da Razão Prática. De posse disso, enumeram-se, da forma mais clara possível, os instrumentos kantianos na "suposta" negação do confl ito moral. Palavras-chave: Kant, Confl ito de deveres, Filosofi a Prática. AbstractThis article aims at situating the question of confl ict of duties when inserted in Kant's Ethical System, considering that this question was not widely approached in Kant's works. Initially, the central concepts of duty and maxim are discussed in order to have enough conceptual elements for the problematic. The Kantian approach to confl icts of duty is shown through the exposition of a passage from The Metaphysics of Morals, in which Kant mentions that a collision of duties would be inconceivable in his ethical system. However, it is possible to notice that the kantian argument in the passage is quite vague and is based almost entirely on the concept of "ground of obligation", which the author does not clearly elucidate. Besides, the examples used in the casuistic of the work do not answer the question of the denial of confl ict, making the interpretation harder. In order to try to improve this scenario, the correspondence between this denial made by Kant in the Metaphysics of Morals is explored in two of his other ethical works: Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of Practical Reason. Thereafter, the instruments used in Kant's supposed denial of the moral confl ict are enumerated and described in the clearest possible way.
O artigo trata da esfera pública, opinião pública e liberdade de imprensa segundo G. W. F. Hegel como formas de mediação entre o estado e o indivíduo e expressão da liberdade individual ou coletiva. A partir do exame dos Princípios de Filosofia do Direito (1821) e das Lições sobre a filosofia do Direito (1818-1831) editadas por K.-H. Ilting, afirma-se a idéia de que Hegel não foi um defensor da censura do estado autoritário prussiano, mas da liberdade de expressão do indivíduo no contexto da sociedade política.
Abstract:In the history of moral philosophy, from Plato, to Aristotle, I. Kant, J. Stuart Mill, and more recently including rationalists like J. Habermas, J. Rawls, R. M. Hare and C. Korsgaard, several attempts have been made to show that reason is the best guide to our moral actions and judgements. On the other hand, some philosophers like D. Hume, A. Smith, A. J. Ayer, P. F. Strawson, and S. Blackburn have taught that morality must be a task of our moral sentiments. I think it is more plausible to accept that both of our capacities must be considered in moral decision-making, because there are important new data from psychology, the cognitive sciences and neurosciences that provide evidence for the importance of emotions in our decisions, not just rationality. Moral laws, moral values and moral sentiments might all give us good reasons to act morally. This is the reason, why I support the view that moral philosophy accounts fail to offer a good way to treat ethical issues when they do not also consider the importance of emotions. From this point of view, I intend to show here that one form of intuitionism can help us to answer the question about moral knowledge and to grasp the way in which we decide. I argue that this form of intuitionism should be able to help us to deal with moral dilemmas. In the first section of this article, I consider the definitions of moral dilemmas, then, in the second, third, and fourth sections I explain three forms of intuitionism -the rationalist (D. Ross), the empiricist (R. Audi), and the reflexive (C. Gowans) -and finally in the last section I point out a new way of thinking about our intuitions. I will call this form naturalistic intuitionism. Moral naturalism is the assumption that our decisions or judgements are partially determined by a natural process and natural properties of the world. In this sense I assume that some of our emotional capacities (like the ability to feel disgust, outrage, indignation, regret, shame, etc), or cognitive capacities (e.g. rationality, cognition) are hardwired into our psychology. This means that social moral rules are learned from childhood, although given by evolution. Hence, they can be taken as natural in the sense that they are the product both of the social world and of the biological constitution of the human being.
ResumoO objetivo do artigo é fazer uma nova análise da posição de P. F. Strawson sobre a relação entre livre arbítrio e responsabilidade moral, considerando a literatura recente sobre o tema. Parte-se, primeiramente, da relação entre liberdade e determinismo da ação. Em segundo lugar, analisa-se o texto de P. F. Strawson Liberdade e ressentimento, examinando sua proposta, referenciada na literatura recente como tendo dado uma contribuição fundamental para discussão do problema da responsabilidade, ao mostrar que as teorias da responsabilidade moral, teriam superintelectualizado as noções de responsabilidade, censura moral e culpa. Na conclusão é apontado que, por um lado, o referido texto teria mudado a abordagem do problema da responsabilidade através do seu conceito de atitudes reativas, por outro, essa noção de Strawson, deixando de lado uma metafísica da liberdade, tenderia a um tipo de naturalização da moral, presentes na teoria moral de E. Tugendhat e na proposta de A. N. de Brito. Palavras-chave: Livre arbítrio; responsabilidade moral. AbstractThe objective of this article is to make a new analysis of the position of the the position of P.F.Strawson concerning the relationship between free will and moral responsibility, taking into account the recent literature about the subject. We have to start, at fi rst, with the relation between freedom and determinism of the action. Second, the famous text Freedom and Ressentment by P.F. Strawson has to be analised, examining his proposal mentioned in a recent literature as having given a fundamental contribution for the discussion of the problem of responsibility, when showing that the theories of moral responsibility would have been over intelectualized the notions of responsibility, moral censorship, and guilt. At the conclusion it is pointed out that, on one hand, the text mentioned would have changed the approach of the problem of responsibility through its concept of reactive attitudes; on the other hand, this notion of Strawson, leaving aside a metaphysics of the freedom, there would be a tendency to one kind of naturalization of the morality present in the moral theory of E. Tugendhat and in the proposal of A.N. de Brito. Key words: free will; moral responsibility
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