One of the basic functions of establishing corporate governance (CG) in companies is improving performance and increasing value for shareholders. Expanding the company’s value will ultimately increase the shareholders’ wealth. Therefore, it is natural for shareholders to seek to improve their performance and increase the company’s value. If CG mechanisms cannot perform this function in companies, they do not have the necessary efficiency and effectiveness and, therefore, cannot improve the efficiency of companies. This article investigatedthe connection between the power of major shareholders and the modality of CG of companies listed on the Iranian capital market before and after the COVID-19 pandemic. The statistical sample of the research included120 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange for the selected period from 2011 to 2021. The results showed that the concentration of ownership is harmful to adopting corporate governance (GCG) practices. In particular, the high level of voter ownership concentration weakens the corporate governance system (CGS). The results of this study, which was conducted using panel analysis, revealed that the concentration of ownership impairsthe quality of CGS, and major shareholders cannot challenge the power of the main shareholder; it alsonegatively affected the quality of businessboards, both during and before the COVID-19 pandemic. The competitiveness and voting rights of the major shareholders negatively affectedthe quality of board composition before and after the COVID-19 pandemic. The concentration of voter ownership also negatively affected the quality of CGS, both during and before COVID-19, and the competitiveness and voting rights of major shareholders before COVID-19. This concentration positively affected the quality of CGS after the COVID-19 pandemic.
Project risk is an uncertain situation or event that, if it occurs, may have a negative or positive effect on one or more project objectives, such as scope, schedule, cost, and quality. Major industrial projects are increasingly facing complexity and uncertainty. The scope of this paper is related to petrochemical projects, in which risks directly affect the approved time, cost, and quality of the project. In such projects, there are risks that neither the owner nor the contractor has the main role in the occurrence or prevention of, and it is not easy to determine who is responsible for them. In such projects, there are risks that neither the owner nor the contractor has the main role in the occurrence or prevention of, and for which it is not easy to determine responsibility. Therefore, predicting, identifying, analyzing, and determining of the optimal allocation of risk responsibility between contracting parties is one of the most important steps before the start of the project. Suppose it is not correctly allocated among project stakeholders, then, in that case, risk responsibility imposes costs on the project that must be paid by the owner, contractor, and partnership, causing, in general, many problems for project management. Therefore, this paper presents a model to calculate the optimal ratio of risk allocation between the project parties in the concluding contract stage, using the UTA-STAR technique to obtain the owner and contractor utility function to create as much of a win-win relationship between them as possible.
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