Many ''workers'' in north temperate colonies of the eusocial paper wasp Polistes fuscatus disappear within a few days of eclosion. We provide evidence that these females are pursuing an alternative reproductive strategy, i.e., dispersing to overwinter and become nest foundresses the following spring, instead of helping to rear brood on their natal nests. A female is most likely to stay and help at the natal nest (i.e., least likely to disperse) when it is among the first workers to emerge and when it emerges on a nest with more pupae (even though worker-brood relatedness tends to be lower in such colonies). The latter cause may result from the fact that pupae-laden nests are especially likely to survive, and thus any direct or indirect reproductive payoffs for staying and working are less likely to be lost. Disappearing females are significantly smaller than predicted if dispersal tendency was independent of body size (emergence order-controlled), suggesting that the females likely to be most effective at challenging for reproductive rights within the natal colony (i.e., the largest females) are also most likely to stay. Thus, early dispersal is conditional on a female's emergence order, the maturity of its natal nest, and its body size. Finally, we present evidence that foundresses may actively limit the sizes of first-emerging females, perhaps to decrease the probability that the latter can effectively challenge foundresses for reproductive rights. The degree to which foundresses limit the size of first-emerging females accords well with the predictions of the theory of staying incentives.
We show that a new, simple, and robust general mechanism for the social suppression of within-group selfishness follows from Hamilton's rule applied in a multilevel selection approach to asymmetrical, two-person groups: If it pays a group member to behave selfishly (i.e., increase its share of the group's reproduction, at the expense of group productivity), then its partner will virtually always be favored to provide a reproductive "bribe" sufficient to remove the incentive for the selfish behavior. The magnitude of the bribe will vary directly with the number of offspring (or other close kin) potentially gained by the selfish individual and inversely with both the relatedness r between the interactants and the loss in group productivity because of selfishness. This bribe principle greatly extends the scope for cooperation within groups. Reproductive bribing is more likely to be favored over social policing for dominants rather than subordinates and as intragroup relatedness increases. Finally, analysis of the difference between the group optimum for an individual's behavior and the individual's inclusive fitness optimum reveals a paradoxical feedback loop by which bribing and policing, while nullifying particular selfish acts, automatically widen the separation of individual and group optima for other behaviors (i.e., resolution of one conflict intensifies others).
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