A core brain network has been proposed to underlie a number of different processes, including remembering, prospection, navigation, and theory of mind [Buckner, R. L., & Carroll, D. C. Self-projection and the brain. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11, 49-57, 2007]. This purported network-medial prefrontal, medial-temporal, and medial and lateral parietal regions-is similar to that observed during default-mode processing and has been argued to represent self-projection [Buckner, R. L., & Carroll, D. C. Self-projection and the brain. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11, 49-57, 2007] or scene-construction [Hassabis, D., & Maguire, E. A. Deconstructing episodic memory with construction. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11, 299-306, 2007]. To date, no systematic and quantitative demonstration of evidence for this common network has been presented. Using the activation likelihood estimation (ALE) approach, we conducted four separate quantitative meta-analyses of neuroimaging studies on: (a) autobiographical memory, (b) navigation, (c) theory of mind, and (d) default mode. A conjunction analysis between these domains demonstrated a high degree of correspondence. We compared these findings to a separate ALE analysis of prospection studies and found additional correspondence. Across all domains, and consistent with the proposed network, correspondence was found within the medial-temporal lobe, precuneus, posterior cingulate, retrosplenial cortex, and the temporo-parietal junction. Additionally, this study revealed that the core network extends to lateral prefrontal and occipital cortices. Autobiographical memory, prospection, theory of mind, and default mode demonstrated further reliable involvement of the medial prefrontal cortex and lateral temporal cortices. Autobiographical memory and theory of mind, previously studied as distinct, exhibited extensive functional overlap. These findings represent quantitative evidence for a core network underlying a variety of cognitive domains.

Fiction literature has largely been ignored by psychology researchers because its only function seems to be entertainment, with no connection to empirical validity. We argue that literary narratives have a more important purpose. They offer models or simulations of the social world via abstraction, simplification, and compression. Narrative fiction also creates a deep and immersive simulative experience of social interactions for readers. This simulation facilitates the communication and understanding of social information and makes it more compelling, achieving a form of learning through experience. Engaging in the simulative experiences of fiction literature can facilitate the understanding of others who are different from ourselves and can augment our capacity for empathy and social inference.

A great deal of research exists on the neural basis of theory-of-mind (ToM) or mentalizing. Qualitative reviews on this topic have identified a mentalizing network composed of the medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate/precuneus, and bilateral temporal parietal junction. These conclusions, however, are not based on a quantitative and systematic approach. The current review presents a quantitative meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies pertaining to ToM, using the activation-likelihood estimation (ALE) approach. Separate ALE meta-analyses are presented for story-based and nonstory-based studies of ToM. The conjunction of these two meta-analyses reveals a core mentalizing network that includes areas not typically noted by previous reviews. A third ALE meta-analysis was conducted with respect to story comprehension in order to examine the relation between ToM and stories. Story processing overlapped with many regions of the core mentalizing network, and these shared regions bear some resemblance to a network implicated by a number of other processes.

In order to formulate a parsimonious tool to assess empathy, we used factor analysis on a combination of self-report measures to examine consensus and developed a brief self-report measure of this common factor. The Toronto Empathy Questionnaire (TEQ) represents empathy as a primarily emotional process. In three studies, the TEQ demonstrated strong convergent validity, correlating positively with behavioral measures of social decoding, self-report measures of empathy, and negatively with a measure of Autism symptomatology. Moreover, it exhibited good internal consistency and high test-retest reliability. The TEQ is a brief, reliable, and valid instrument for the assessment of empathy. KeywordsEmpathy; Self-report; Questionnaire; Factor analysis Empathy is an important component of social cognition that contributes to our ability to understand and respond adaptively to others' emotions, succeed in emotional communication, and promote prosocial behavior. The term "empathy" is derived from Titchener's (1909;Wispé, 1986) translation of the German word Einfühlung, meaning "feeling into" (Wispé, 1987). Generally speaking, it refers to the consequences of perceiving the feeling state of another as well as the capacity to do so accurately. Despite the prominence of the empathy construct in developmental research (Sagi & Hoffman, 1976;Ungerer, 1990;Zahn-Waxler, Friedman & Cummings, 1983), and cross-species investigations of empathic capabilities (Masserman, Wechkin & Terris, 1964;Rice & Gainer, 1962), a clear, consensual definition of the construct of empathy remains elusive.Corresponding author: R. Nathan Spreng, Rotman Research Institute at Baycrest Centre, 3560 Bathurst Street, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, M6A 2E1, Phone: 416.785.2500, x.2826, Fax: 416.785.2862 NIH-PA Author ManuscriptNIH-PA Author Manuscript NIH-PA Author ManuscriptRecent research into empathy emphasizes the distinction between cognitive and emotional components of the construct (Preston & de Waal, 2002). These components assume various definitions. Put simply, however, emotional empathy is commonly thought of as an emotional reaction (e.g., compassion) to another's emotional response (e.g., sadness). This reaction is not dependent on a cognitive understanding of why a person is suffering (Rankin, Kramer & Miller, 2005), although it may facilitate understanding and action. By contrast, cognitive empathy involves an intellectual or imaginative apprehension of another's emotional state, often described as overlapping with the construct of theory of mind (understanding the thoughts and feelings of others) and used interchangeably by some authors (Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, BaronCohen, David, 2004). Numerous authors focus on distinguishing empathy from the related concepts of emotional contagion, sympathy and perspective-taking surveyed in some selfreport measures of empathy (Wispé, 1987;Wispé, 1986;Omdahl, 1995). Whereas emotional contagion (also referred to as personal distress) involves the perceiver assuming the emotional state of the target, sympa...

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