Individual differences in face recognition are often contrasted with differences in object recognition using a single object category. Likewise, individual differences in perceptual expertise for a given object domain have typically been measured relative to only a single category baseline. In Experiment 1, we present a new test of object recognition, the Vanderbilt Expertise Test (VET), which is comparable in methods to the Cambridge Face Memory Task (CFMT) but uses eight different object categories. Principal component analysis reveals that the underlying structure of the VET can be largely explained by two independent factors, which demonstrate good reliability and capture interesting sex differences inherent in the VET structure. In Experiment 2, we show how the VET can be used to separate domain-specific from domain-general contributions to a standard measure of perceptual expertise. While domain-specific contributions are found for car matching for both men and women and for plane matching in men, women in this sample appear to use more domain-general strategies to match planes. In Experiment 3, we use the VET to demonstrate that holistic processing of faces predicts face recognition independently of general object recognition ability, which has a sex-specific contribution to face recognition. Overall, the results suggest that the VET is a reliable and valid measure of object recognition abilities and can measure both domain-general skills and domain-specific expertise, which were both found to depend on the sex of observers.

The fusiform face area (FFA) is a region of human cortex that responds selectively to faces, but whether it supports a more general function relevant for perceptual expertise is debated. Although both faces and objects of expertise engage many brain areas, the FFA remains the focus of the strongest modular claims and the clearest predictions about expertise. Functional MRI studies at standard-resolution (SR-fMRI) have found responses in the FFA for nonface objects of expertise, but high-resolution fMRI (HR-fMRI) in the FFA [Grill-Spector K, et al. (2006) Nat Neurosci 9:1177-1185] and neurophysiology in face patches in the monkey brain [Tsao DY, et al. (2006) Science 311:670-674] reveal no reliable selectivity for objects. It is thus possible that FFA responses to objects with SR-fMRI are a result of spatial blurring of responses from nonfaceselective areas, potentially driven by attention to objects of expertise. Using HR-fMRI in two experiments, we provide evidence of reliable responses to cars in the FFA that correlate with behavioral car expertise. Effects of expertise in the FFA for nonface objects cannot be attributed to spatial blurring beyond the scale at which modular claims have been made, and within the lateral fusiform gyrus, they are restricted to a small area (200 mm 2 on the right and 50 mm 2 on the left) centered on the peak of face selectivity. Experience with a category may be sufficient to explain the spatially clustered face selectivity observed in this region.neural selectivity | object recognition | individual differences | response reliability | ventral temporal cortex

Some research finds that face recognition is largely independent from the recognition of other objects; a specialized and innate ability to recognize faces could therefore have little or nothing to do with our ability to recognize objects. We propose a new framework in which recognition performance for any category is the product of domain-general ability and category-specific experience. In Experiment 1, we show that the overlap between face and object recognition depends on experience with objects. In 256 subjects we measured face recognition, object recognition for eight categories, and self-reported experience with these categories. Experience predicted neither face recognition nor object recognition but moderated their relationship: Face recognition performance is increasingly similar to object recognition performance with increasing object experience. If a subject has a lot of experience with objects and is found to perform poorly, they also prove to have a low ability with faces. In a follow-up survey, we explored the dimensions of experience with objects that may have contributed to self-reported experience in Experiment 1. Different dimensions of experience appear to be more salient for different categories, with general self-reports of expertise reflecting judgments of verbal knowledge about a category more than judgments of visual performance. The complexity of experience and current limitations in its measurement support the importance of aggregating across multiple categories. Our findings imply that both face and object recognition are supported by a common, domain-general ability expressed through experience with a category and best measured when accounting for experience.

This study explores the effect of individuation training on the acquisition of race-specific expertise. First, we investigated whether practice individuating other-race faces yields improvement in perceptual discrimination for novel faces of that race. Second, we asked whether there was similar improvement for novel faces of a different race for which participants received equal practice, but in an orthogonal task that did not require individuation. Caucasian participants were trained to individuate faces of one race (African American or Hispanic) and to make difficult eye-luminance judgments on faces of the other race. By equating these tasks we are able to rule out raw experience, visual attention, or performance ⁄ success-induced positivity as the critical factors that produce race-specific improvements. These results indicate that individuation practice is one mechanism through which cognitive, perceptual, and ⁄ or social processes promote growth of the own-race face recognition advantage.

Expertise effects for nonface objects in face-selective brain areas may reflect stable aspects of neuronal selectivity that determine how observers perceive objects. However, bottom-up (e.g., clutter from irrelevant objects) and top-down manipulations (e.g., attentional selection) can influence activity, affecting the link between category selectivity and individual performance. We test the prediction that individual differences expressed as neural expertise effects for cars in face-selective areas are sufficiently stable to survive clutter and manipulations of attention. Additionally, behavioral work and work using event related potentials suggest that expertise effects may not survive competition; we investigate this using functional magnetic resonance imaging. Subjects varying in expertise with cars made 1-back decisions about cars, faces, and objects in displays containing one or 2 objects, with only one category attended. Univariate analyses suggest car expertise effects are robust to clutter, dampened by reducing attention to cars, but nonetheless more robust to manipulations of attention than competition. While univariate expertise effects are severely abolished by competition between cars and faces, multivariate analyses reveal new information related to car expertise. These results demonstrate that signals in face-selective areas predict expertise effects for nonface objects in a variety of conditions, although individual differences may be expressed in different dependent measures depending on task and instructions.