We test whether social comparison nudges can promote water-saving behaviour among farmers as a complement to traditional CAP measures. We conducted a randomised controlled trial among 200 farmers equipped with irrigation smart meters in SouthWest France. Treated farmers received weekly information on individual and group water consumption over four months. Our results rule out medium to large effect-sizes of the nudge. Moreover, they suggest that the nudge was effective at reducing the consumption of those who irrigate the most, although it appears to have reduced the proportion of those who do not consume water at all.
Biodiversity offsetting (BO) claims to slow down biodiversity loss caused by development projects by generating ecological gains mainly through restoration activities conducted on land acquired to this effect. This leads to social conflicts around accessing land, especially with farmers and other land-users. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the opportunities and challenges of implementing BO by involving farmers through contracts akin to agri-environmental or stewardship schemes to produce ecological gains. We call them Agrienvironmental Biodiversity Offsets Schemes (ABOS) and conduct an empirical analysis of a large ABOS program implemented for a new railway line in Southern France. We examine the effectiveness of ABOS through a survey carried out with 145 farmers and find that the main determinants of ABOS acceptability are: i) socioeconomic factors, ii) social norms, iii) trust with contracting institutions, and iv) ease of integration in farm activities. Although ABOS allow developers to meet their legal requirements, major concerns are raised about additionality, especially through the manifestation of windfall effects, long-term permanence, and noncompliance with contract requirements. We conclude with policy recommendations and research perspectives to improve the implementation of ABOS for both nature and people.
This paper examines the relationship between environmental policy and growth when green preferences are endogenously determined by education and pollution. We consider an environmental policy in which the government implements a tax on pollution and recycles the revenue to fund pollution abatement activities and/or an education subsidy (influencing green behaviors). When the sensitivity of agents' environmental preferences to pollution and human capital is high, the economy can converge to a balanced growth path equilibrium with damped oscillations. We show that this environmental policy can both remove the oscillations, associated with intergenerational inequalities, and enhance the long-term growth rate. However, this solution requires that the revenue from the tax rate must be allocated to education and direct environmental protection simultaneously. We demonstrate that this type of mixed-instrument environment policy is an effective way to address environmental and economic issues in both the short and the long run.
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