Do individuals reveal their true preferences when asked for their support for an ongoing war? This research note presents the results of a list experiment implemented in the midst of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Our experiment allows us to estimate the extent of preference falsification with regard to support for the war by comparing the experimental results with a direct question. Our data comes from an online sample of 3000 Russians. Results show high levels of support for the war and significant levels of preference falsification: when asked directly, 71% of respondents support the war, while this share drops to 61% when using the list experiment. Preference falsification is particularly pronounced among individuals using TV as a main source of news. Our results imply that war leaders can pursue peace without fearing a large popular backlash, but also show that high levels of support for war can be sustained even once the brutality of the war has become clear.
In this paper, we test if sanctions applied to an entire group for the free-riding of one of its members can increase the level of cooperation within that group. To measure the efficiency of such collective sanctions, we conducted a lab experiment based on a standard public good game. The results show that overall, collective sanctions are inefficient. Moreover, when subjects are able to punish their peers, the level of cooperation is lower in the regime of collective sanctions than under individual sanctions. Both outcomes can be explained by a general disapproval of the collective responsibility for an individual fault: in the post-experimental survey, an absolute majority evaluated such regimes as unfair. But although collective sanctions are not an effective means to boost group compliance, there are nevertheless two insights to be gained here. First, there are differences across genders. Under collective sanctions, males' level of compliance is substantially higher than under individual sanctions while the opposite is true for females. Second, there were intriguing differences in outcomes between the different regime types. Under collective sanctions, a person who is caught tends to comply in the future, at least in the short term. In contrast, under individual sanctions, an individual wrongdoer decreases his or her level of compliance in the next period. ATTACHMENTS CP -No Sanctions.docx CP With Int Sanctions.docx IP -No Sanctions.docx IP with Int Sanctions.docx Script for Collective liability experiment.docx
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