We establish the existence of anomalous excess returns based on trend following strategies across four asset classes (commodities, currencies, stock indices, bonds) and over very long time scales. We use for our studies both futures time series, that exist since 1960, and spot time series that allow us to go back to 1800 on commodities and indices. The overall t-stat of the excess returns is ≈ 5 since 1960 and ≈ 10 since 1800, after accounting for the overall upward drift of these markets. The effect is very stable, both across time and asset classes. It makes the existence of trends one of the most statistically significant anomalies in financial markets. When analyzing the trend following signal further, we find a clear saturation effect for large signals, suggesting that fundamentalist traders do not attempt to resist "weak trends", but step in when their own signal becomes strong enough. Finally, we study the performance of trend following in the recent period. We find no sign of a statistical degradation of long trends, whereas shorter trends have significantly withered.

We present extensive evidence that "risk premium" is strongly correlated with tail-risk skewness but very little with volatility. We introduce a new, intuitive definition of skewness and elicit an approximately linear relation between the Sharpe ratio of various risk premium strategies (Equity, Fama-French, FX Carry, Short Vol, Bonds, Credit) and their negative skewness. We find a clear exception to this rule: trend following has both positive skewness and positive excess returns. This is also true, albeit less markedly, of the Fama-French "Value" factor and of the "Low Volatility" strategy. This suggests that some strategies are not risk premia but genuine market anomalies. Based on our results, we propose an objective criterion to assess the quality of a risk-premium portfolio.

We provide further evidence that markets trend on the medium term (months) and mean-revert on the long term (several years). Our results bolster Black's intuition that prices tend to be off roughly by a factor of 2, and take years to equilibrate. The story behind these results fits well with the existence of two types of behaviour in financial markets: "chartists", who act as trend followers, and "fundamentalists", who set in when the price is clearly out of line. Mean-reversion is a self-correcting mechanism, tempering (albeit only weakly) the exuberance of financial markets.

Markowitz' celebrated optimal portfolio theory generally fails to deliver out-of-sample diversification. In this note, we propose a new portfolio construction strategy based on symmetry arguments only, leading to "Eigenrisk Parity" portfolios that achieve equal realized risk on all the principal components of the covariance matrix. This holds true for any other definition of uncorrelated factors. We then specialize our general formula to the most agnostic case where the indicators of future returns are assumed to be uncorrelated and of equal variance. This "Agnostic Risk Parity" (AGP) portfolio minimizes unknown-unknown risks generated by over-optimistic hedging of the different bets. AGP is shown to fare quite well when applied to standard technical strategies such as trend following.

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