Experts play a critical role in forensic decision making, even when cognition is offloaded and distributed between human and machine. In this paper, we investigated the impact of using Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS) on human decision makers. We provided 3680 AFIS lists (a total of 55,200 comparisons) to 23 latent fingerprint examiners as part of their normal casework. We manipulated the position of the matching print in the AFIS list. The data showed that latent fingerprint examiners were affected by the position of the matching print in terms of false exclusions and false inconclusives. Furthermore, the data showed that false identification errors were more likely at the top of the list and that such errors occurred even when the correct match was present further down the list. These effects need to be studied and considered carefully, so as to optimize human decision making when using technologies such as AFIS.KEYWORDS: forensic science, AFIS, contextual effects, distributed cognition, cognitive influences, technology, decision making, biasThe landscape in forensic science, as in other expert domains (e.g., medicine and policing), is changing drastically. A main force in shaping these (and future) changes is technology. Especially influential are cognitive technologies-that is, systems that can carry out cognitive operations that were once the sole domain of humans (1). The increased use and reliance on technology have reached a level whereby humans and technology are more and more intertwined and collaborating with one another, creating distributed cognition (2,3). With distributed cognition, humans ''offload'' some cognitive operations onto technology thereby increasing their performance abilities and capacity (4). As human-technology cooperation increases, as they become more intertwined and cognition is increasingly distributed, new opportunities and capabilities arise, as well as new challenges. These have transformed a technological evolution into a revolution. These new possibilities affect human cognition and alter how we go about our professional and personal lives (5).Distributed cognition may take different forms and generate a variety of modes of collaboration and interaction between the human and technology. Dror and Mnookin (6) specifically distinguished between three modes: At a low level, technology merely offers a quantitative gain in efficiency; it does not qualitatively transform what is possible. Technology at this level might include, for example, using a computer to store information rather than memorizing it, or using a calculator rather the doing the math. In these cases, the human expert is using technology to save time and cognitive resources. A higher level of distributed cognition and cooperation occurs when the human and technology work side by side as partners. In this case, the technology plays a role that the human expert is incapable of doing (and vice versa: the human expert plays a role that cannot be carried out by the technology). Such human-t...

In this study, we investigated the emotional and motivational factors involved in fingerprint analysis in day-to-day routine case work and in significant and harrowing criminal investigations. Thematic analysis was performed on interviews with 13 experienced fingerprint examiners from a variety of law enforcement agencies. The data revealed factors relating to job satisfaction and the use of skill. Individual satisfaction related to catching criminals was observed; this was most notable in solving high profile, serious, or long-running cases. There were positive emotional effects associated with matching fingerprints and apparent fear of making errors. Finally, we found evidence for a need of cognitive closure in fingerprint examiner decision-making.

Risk information framing can be a powerful tool for aiding the communication of risk and improving decision-making. However, little work has investigated the extent that these framing effects depend on the characteristics of the perceiver. In our study, we examine whether the effects of different risk-pricing formats on risky choices are the same for all individuals, no matter their domain experience or cultural background, or whether there are interactions between these factors. Survey 1 revealed that three risk-pricing formats of the same choice problem resulted in the same individuals making different risky choices (preference reversal);suggesting that risk-perception was distorted by the risk-pricing format manipulation. In Survey 2, the effects of the risk-pricing formats were shown to differ by the participants' cultural background (Asian vs. European) and the extent of their domain experience. The fact that there were no differences between the cultural or domain experience groups in their overall tendency to select riskier (cf. safer) choices indicates that risk behavior differences between groups are often closely linked to perceptual, rather than simply attitudinal, cognitiveprocesses. The results demonstrate the complex, interactive cognitive processes that are used to encode risk information, involving the framing of the information and the cultural background and previous experiences of the individual. We conclude that it is important to consider the characteristics of the individual (e.g., culture, domain experience, etc.) when manipulating riskinformation framing with the aim of improving their risk communication.Key words: framing, culture, risk-information, domain-experience, risk-communication 2 Acknowledgement:We should like to thank Professor Michael Siegrist and the anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper.3

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