We examine the problem of how to accelerate policies related to electric vehicles (EVs) in the Nordic countries Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. These four Nordic countries represent an interesting collection of cases by virtue of having common decarbonization targets extending to the transport sector, interlinked electric energy systems and a joint electricity market largely based on low-carbon energy while they are open societies bent on innovation, making them well adaptable to a transition toward electric mobility. Our analytical framework drawing from transition research, lock-in and path dependency and institutionalism enables us to discern technological, institutional and behavioral mechanisms which can have both constraining and enabling effects vis-à-vis this transition by means of shaping national socio-technical systems and regimes. On this basis, we also discuss how to develop policies accelerating the transition. We find that the incumbent industries can shape policy choice through the lock-in into institutional inter-dependencies. The accumulation of social and material features, and vested interests of actors, for its part can maintain regime level inertia, impeding the transition. Yet, technological lock-in can also enable EVs, by means of learning effects from technologically interrelated wind energy projects and available infrastructure in buildings that support the EV charging needs. Overall, the complexity of path-dependent mechanisms embedded in the dominant regimes, together with the diversity of emerging policy mixes, demands attention both on the technologies and broader socio-technical systems in order to properly assess the prospects of transition toward electric mobility.

We compare Russian nuclear energy diplomacy towards Finland and Hungary, where the Russian state corporation Rosatom intends to build nuclear power plants by the 2020s. Russian nuclear energy diplomacy features Rosatom working with other state institutions, its own subsidiaries and an extensive network of companies and R&D actors to support Russian nuclear power projects abroad. Using the structuration approach, we find three interests driving such diplomacy: energy business and associated profits; modernization of the Russian economy, including the diversification of its export structure; while foreign policy interests are also involved, considering the constraints emerging in EU-Russia energy diplomacy in the oil and gas sectors, including the sanctions since 2014. Some domestic actors in Finland and Hungary make the linkage between nuclear energy and foreign policy as explicit as do some western commentators. Seeking to pursue these interests, Russian actors must accommodate their considerable assets to the structural constraints they encounter in the target countries. We identify four structural dimensions The Russian actors are well endowed as regards the resources, technology, and infrastructure dimension; and the dimension of finance, business models, and markets. However, on the institutional dimension they face a less controllable environment. Regarding the ecological dimension, they must conform to local safety requirements. In both cases, Russian actors were able to strengthen perceptions of joint interests with actors in the target country facilitating the nuclear power plant projects, thereby paving the way for the use of soft power.

In this article, we examine Russia's geo-economy under the economic sanctions imposed by the EU, the USA and many other states since spring 2014, including restrictions on economic cooperation in areas such as trade, certain types of energy technology, access to credit, trade in arms, travel bans and asset freezing. We first examine Russia's economic and geopolitical interests and the cognitive frames Russian policymakers use to weigh these diverse interests against each other. Second, we examine how Russian policymakers can further these interests given the effect of the sanctions on Russia's geo-economy. We analyse constraints and opportunities along the resource geographic, financial and institutional dimensions of geo-economy. Regarding resources, the sanctions seriously hamper new greenfield projects in Russia's emerging energy provinces. They impede the industry's middle-to long-term prospects while some Russians perceive new opportunities for its domestically induced modernisation. Along the financial dimension, low oil prices since mid-2014 shape existing fossil fuels trade more than the sanctions, which have no impact on Russia's arms exports. The combined effect of low oil prices and sanctions on Russia's state budget, the financial sector and the rouble is severe. On the institutional dimension, Russia's international standing suffers, but its domestic institutions are relatively resilient. Overall, we see Russia as part of an international structure where it can constitute itself as an autonomous geo-economic actor under favourable conditions including high oil prices and no sanctions.

This article explores energy security and integration within the European Union (EU) in the case of natural gas. It theorizes the underlying institutional dynamics of integration by drawing upon the English School as to how more deep-seated informal institutions condition policy-making by EU institutions and Member States as well as the operations of transnational actors such as energy companies. The informal institution of sovereignty constrains the push of the market institution towards a convergent type of integration. Together with the bilateral energy diplomacy and great power management institutions, sovereignty also limits integration in the external gas trade. Internal integration overall remains dependent on the wider European context as is also seen in the functioning of the environmental stewardship institution. The ambiguities among actors occasioned by the implementation of the Third Energy Package suggest a further integration need, but that is constrained by several further driving forces.

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