A modern vehicle has a complex internal architecture and is wirelessly connected to the Internet, other vehicles, and the infrastructure. The risk of cyber attacks and other criminal incidents along with recent road accidents caused by autonomous vehicles calls for more research on automotive digital forensics. Failures in automated driving functions can be caused by hardware and software failures and cyber security issues. Thus, it is imperative to be able to determine and investigate the cause of these failures, something which requires trustable data. However, automotive digital forensics is a relatively new field for the automotive where most existing self-monitoring and diagnostic systems in vehicles only monitor safety-related events. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first systematic literature review on the current research within this field. We identify and assess over 300 papers published between 2006 -2021 and further map the relevant papers to different categories based on identified focus areas to give a comprehensive overview of the forensics field and the related research activities. Moreover, we identify forensically relevant data from the literature, link the data to categories, and further map them to required security properties and potential stakeholders. Our categorization makes it easy for practitioners and researchers to quickly find relevant work within a particular sub-field of digital forensics. We believe our contributions can guide digital forensic investigations in automotive and similar areas, such as cyber-physical systems and smart cities, facilitate further research, and serve as a guideline for engineers implementing forensics mechanisms.
Vehicles have evolved from mostly mechanical machines into devices controlled by an internal computer network consisting of more than 100 interconnected Electronic Control Units (ECUs). Moreover, modern vehicles communicate with external devices to enable new features, but these new communication facilities also expose safety-critical functions to security threats. As the most prevalent automotive bus, the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is a prime target for attacks. Even though the computer security community has proposed several message authentication solutions to alleviate those threats, such solutions have not yet been widely adopted by the automotive industry.We have identified the most promising CAN message authentication solutions and provide a comprehensive overview of them. In order to investigate the lack of adoption of such solutions, we, together with industry experts, have identified five general requirements they must fulfill in order to be considered viable in industry. Based on those requirements, we analyze and evaluate the identified authentication solutions. We find that none of them meet all the requirements, and that backward compatibility and acceptable overhead are the biggest obstacles.
Cooperative intelligent transport systems supporting secure vehicle to vehicle and vehicle to infrastructure communications, is becoming a very important topic. The aim of this paper is to share our experiences from implementing the ETSI Intelligent Transport System (ITS) SecuredMessage and sign/verify services on an existing ETSI ITS communication stack (ITSC). We have followed the new ETSI TS 103 097 v1.1.1 standard when implementing the security services, and have made our best to create a robust and secure implementation. Our goal has been to identify flaws and vulnerabilities in our implementation that are caused by weaknesses or deficiencies in the standard and in its description of services.We have then performed an analysis of the protocol, its headers and created test cases used to test our implementation. Several problems were found, and we have also repeated the tests with another, supposedly very stable implementation, provided by Fraunhofer FOKUS. To our surprise, this system also showed unexpected behavior as our system. We show that these problems are the result of weaknesses and complexities in the design of the standard.We present the problems found in our implementation and show what part in the standard was causing the problems. We show that several problems in the standard, mainly due to their complexity, open up for misinterpretation leading to various types of implementation errors. We conclude the paper with proposing changes to the standard to prevent other implementations from repeating the same mistakes.
Research on intelligent transport systems (ITS) for improved traffic safety and efficiency has reached a high level of maturity and first applications will hit the market in 2019. Since 2004, the wireless standard 802.11p has been developed specifically for ITS services. Since then new telecommunication standards have been devised, and the new 5G telecommunication standard is nearing completion. Due to its technological advantages such as higher speeds and reliability, it is being considered to be used for ITS services. The new radio technology "New Radio (NR)", which is being developed as part of 5G, can complement or replace 802.11p in V2X applications. While there has been some work to compare 802.11p and 5G New Radio in terms of performance and applicability for safety-critical use cases, little work has been done to investigate the implications for security. In this paper, we provide an overview of the security requirements of known ETSI ITS use cases, and based on those use cases we compare and assess the security implications of replacing 802.11p with cellular V2X. We find that due to the use of millimeter waves, beamforming and massive MIMO, there will be an implicit improvement for confidentiality and privacy, and it may also be possible to shorten authentication procedures in certain cases. When a fully network-assisted C-V2X mode is chosen, it is also possible to outsource several of the ITS security requirements to the cellular network.
Vehicles have become complex computer systems with multiple communication interfaces. In the future, vehicles will have even more connections to e.g., infrastructure, pedestrian smartphones, cloud, road-side-units and the Internet. External and physical interfaces, as well as internal communication buses have shown to have potential to be exploited for attack purposes. As a consequence, there is an increase in regulations which demand compliance with vehicle cyber resilience requirements. However, there is currently no clear guidance on how to comply with these regulations from a technical perspective. To address this issue, we have performed a comprehensive threat and risk analysis based on published attacks against vehicles from the past 10 years, from which we further derive necessary security and resilience techniques. The work is done using the SPMT methodology where we identify vital vehicle assets, threat actors, their motivations and objectives, and develop a comprehensive threat model. Moreover, we develop a comprehensive attack model by analyzing the identified threats and attacks. These attacks are filtered and categorized based on attack type, probability, and consequence criteria. Additionally, we perform an exhaustive mapping between asset, attack, threat actor, threat category, and required mitigation mechanism for each attack, resulting in a presentation of a secure and resilient vehicle design. Ultimately, we present the Resilient Shield a novel and imperative framework to justify and ensure security and resilience within the automotive domain.
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