We use data from internal assessments of audit quality in a Big 4 firm to investigate the impact of audit firm tenure and auditor‐provided non‐audit services (NAS) on audit quality. We find that first‐year audits receive lower assessments of audit quality and that quality improves shortly thereafter and then declines as tenure becomes very long. Partitioning our sample between SEC registrants and private clients, we find that the decline in audit quality in the long tenure range is attributable to audits of private clients. For audits of SEC registrants, the probability of a high quality audit reaches its maximum with very long tenure. We also find that audit fees are discounted for first‐year audits but auditor effort is higher than in subsequent years. We find no association, on average, between total NAS fees and audit quality in the full sample but observe that total NAS fees are positively associated with quality for SEC registrants and negatively associated with quality for privately held clients. Our findings are important for regulatory policies related to audit firm tenure and auditor‐provided NAS.

SYNOPSIS: An audit consists of two main components: (1) the assessment of risk, and (2) the planning and execution of audit procedures. Both activities require a great deal of professional judgment. In this sense, the auditor is an expert who is best positioned to assess the risk and to conduct the audit in accordance with professional auditing standards. We use a simple decision-making framework to illustrate an auditor's possible strategies when an auditee cannot directly determine the effort level required to conduct an audit appropriately. We discuss and compare three economic perspectives for the audit: search goods, experience goods, and credence goods. Based on the economic theory of credence goods, we predict that a seller has incentives to act strategically when buyers are faced with considerable uncertainties relating to a service they purchase. Specifically, we argue that an auditor might have incentives to (1) under-audit, (2) over-audit, or (3) overcharge. These strategic actions have important implications for audit quality, efficiency, and regulation. We also discuss the professional and institutional arrangements that serve to limit the strategic behavior of auditors. Finally, we discuss previous empirical and behavioral audit evidence in the context of the credence aspects of an audit.

Prior to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, audit partners experienced economic pressure to grow revenue from the sale of nonaudit services to their audit clients. To an auditor who is highly rewarded for revenue generation and growth, nonaudit services may represent a particularly strengthened economic bond with the client. Prior research shows that, in general, nonaudit service fees received in the current period do not impair audit quality. We examine a different setting. We propose that auditor independence can become impaired, and audit quality compromised, when clients that currently purchase relatively low amounts of nonaudit services, increase their purchases of nonaudit services from the auditor in the subsequent period. We test our prediction in the context of earnings management as a proxy for audit quality, measured by (a) performance‐adjusted discretionary accruals and (b) classification shifting of core expenses. Our results indicate that prior to the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act, rewards to the auditor in the form of future additional nonaudit service fees from current‐year high fee‐growth‐opportunity clients adversely affects audit quality. This effect is particularly strong among companies with powerful incentives to manage earnings. Our findings indicate that regulators should consider the multiperiod nature of the client–auditor relationship when contemplating policies that restrict nonaudit services, as well as the overall environment in which audit partners operate. This might include partner compensation arrangements that put pressure on audit partners to focus on increasing revenue at the expense of audit quality.

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