Parties neither cease to exist nor cease to compete for office when the general election is over. Instead, a new round of competition begins, with legislators as voters and party leaders as candidates. The offices at stake are what we call “mega‐seats.” We consider the selection of three different types of mega‐seats—cabinet portfolios, seats on directing boards, and permanent committee chairs—in 57 democratic assemblies. If winning parties select the rules by which mega‐seats are chosen and those rules affect which parties can attain mega‐seats (one important payoff of “winning”), then parties and rules should coevolve in the long run. We find two main patterns relating to legislative party systems and a country's length of experience with democratic governance.
The 1991 Colombian Constitution strengthened the checks and balances by enhancing the role of Congress and the Constitutional Court, while somewhat limiting the powers of the President. As a consequence of the larger number of relevant players, and the removal of barriers that restricted political participation, the political system has gained in terms of representation. However, political transaction costs have increased, making cooperation harder to achieve. This has been typically the case in fiscal policy, where the use of rigid rules have limited the adaptability and flexibility of policies. In other areas of policy, such as monetary policy and regulation of public utilities, policies have been more adaptable to economic shocks, delivering better outcomes. ResumenLa Constitución de 1991 aumentó la injerencia del Congreso y la Corte Constitucional en el proceso político y redujo los poderes del ejecutivo, fortaleciendo así el sistema de pesos y contrapesos. A pesar de que ahora el sistema es más representativo, el mayor número de jugadores aumentó los costos políticos de transacción, lo que hace más difícil la cooperación entre ellos. Esto ha sido particularmente cierto en la política fiscal, donde un Congreso más fragmentado y dividido ha resultado en un mayor uso de inflexibilidades. En otras áreas de política, como la monetaria y la regulación de los servicios públicos, las políticas se han caracterizado por una mayor adaptabilidad.
We examine the tendency for complex ballot tasks to undermine the ability of votes to cast valid ballots. Specifically, we investigate whether ballot design is responsible for the high rate of spoiled ballots in Colombia in 2007. We address this question first by looking at data from a study observing the use of alternate ballot designs in a controlled environment, varying the information voters have when attempting to cast the ballot. We then examine the observed pattern of spoiled ballots in Colombia before and after the implementation of the ballot redesign tested in an experiment conducted in Bogotá. Our results show that there is an independent effect of the ballot design on the amount of spoiled ballots and that this effect correlates with certain selfreported socio-demographic characteristics such as education. We also demonstrate that by improving the usability of the ballot the number of spoiled ballots drops significantly and the effect of socio-demographic variables become less important in explaining the presence of spoiled ballots. Also, aggregate results of the 2011 local elections at the municipal elections show a significant drop in spoiled ballots.
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The Political Economy of Fiscal Reform: Terms of use: Documents inThe Case of Colombia, 1986Colombia, -2006 Mauricio Olivera* Mónica Pachón** Guillermo Perry* * Fedesarrollo ** Universidad de los Andes This paper explores the characteristics of the political economy process that conditioned the scope and success of the combination of fiscal reforms before and after Colombia's 1991 constitutional reforms. Using formal analysis of reforms and interviews with actors, reforms in taxation, decentralization, the budgetary process and pensions are examined in times of political crisis, economic crisis, and economic boom. The results generally confirm the hypothesis that increased political fragmentation and limited unilateral executive power after the 1991 reforms restricted the extent of reforms, particularly in tax law. Nonetheless, the enactment of piecemeal reforms was encouraged by crisis conditions. JEL Classifications: H20, H71, H77
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