Repetition has been shown to increase subjective truth ratings of trivia statements. This truth effect can be measured in two ways: (a) as the increase in subjective truth from the first to the second encounter ( within-items criterion) and (b) as the difference in truth ratings between repeated and other new statements ( between-items criterion). Qualitative differences are assumed between the processes underlying both criteria. A meta-analysis of the truth effect was conducted that compared the two criteria. In all, 51 studies of the repetition-induced truth effect were included in the analysis. Results indicate that the between-items effect is larger than the within-items effect. Moderator analyses reveal that several moderators affect both effects differentially. This lends support to the notion that different psychological comparison processes may underlie the two effects. The results are discussed within the processing fluency account of the truth effect.

Recent theories in social psychology suggest that explicitly measured attitudes are particularly valuable for the prediction of deliberate, controlled behaviour. In contrast, implicitly measured attitudes are assumed to be more important for the prediction of less controlled, more impulsive behaviour. Yet, conclusive evidence for the differential predictive validity of both measures is scarce. We hypothesized that limitations of different control resources would lead to functionally equivalent effects. In Study 1, cognitive capacity moderated the predictive validity of both explicit and implicit attitude measures in a choice task. Self-regulatory resources led to similar patterns for eating (Study 2) and drinking behaviour (Study 3). In addition to the predictive validity of implicit and explicit attitude measures, in Study 3 we more closely investigated the relative contributions of explicitly measured attitudes and general restraint standards as two distinct, but complementing constructs that are dependent on control resources.

In the present study, subjects had to generate an evaluative judgment about a target person on the basis of his behaviour that had both positive and negative implications. In a previous phase of the study that was ostensibly unrelated to the judgment task, the relevant trait categories were primed. Subsequently, half of the subjects were reminded of the priming episode. Consistent with earlier research (e.g. Lombardi, Higgins and Bargh, 1987;Newman and Uleman, 1990)

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